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A

Complementarity

Conundrum:

International Criminal Enforcement
in the Mexican Drug War
ABSTRACT

Drug-related violence in Mexico has claimed over 34,000
lives since Mexican President Felipe Calder6n initiated his
crackdown on Mexico's drug cartels in 2006 with the
deployment of military troops to Michoacdn. Somewhat
surprisingly, Mexico's drug war has garnered rather little
attention from the internationalcommunity, despite a wealth of
headlines in popular media. This Note takes up the question of
internationalcriminal enforcement in Mexico against Los Zetas,
widely considered Mexico's most violent drug cartel. By setting
up a hypothetical-but possible-InternationalCriminal Court
(ICC) prosecution of Los Zetas cartel leader Heriberto Lazcano,
this Note demonstrates that the ICC Prosecutor could likely
show sufficient evidence of Lazcano's liability for Crimes
Against Humanity for the purposes of obtaining an arrest
warrant from the Pre-Trial Chamber. However, assuming
Mexico would in fact prosecute Lazcano domestically,
significant admissibility issues would arise given that Mexico
lacks a domestic codification of Crimes Against Humanity, the
relevant ICC crime. This presents a unique situation to analyze
whether a concurrent domestic prosecutionfor "ordinarycrimes"
could lead to a finding of "unable to prosecute" under Article 17
of the Rome Statute, which would result in the admissibility of
the case before the ICC despite concurrent state action. The
ordinary crimes analysis with respect to Mexico's inability (or
ability) to prosecute this potential case has broad implications
for the nature of the ICC's complementarity regime as an
effective guardianof state sovereignty.
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I. INTRODUCTION

On December 16, 2009, Mexican naval forces raided the hideout
of Arturo Beltran Leyva, one of Mexico's most prominent drug lords.'
Beltran Leyva was a close ally of Los Zetas, an up-and-coming narco2
trafficking organization with extensive paramilitary capabilities.
The "Boss of Bosses," as Beltran Leyva was known, was killed during
the raid in a great victory for President Felipe Calder6n's ongoing

1.
Tomas Kellner & Francesco Pipitone, Inside Mexicos Drug War, 27 WORLD
POL'Y J. 29, 33 (2010).
2.
Id. at 32-33.
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offensive against the drug cartels. 3 Ensign Angulo Cordova of the
Mexican Navy also lost his life during the two-hour gunfight. 4 As
President Calder6n celebrated Angulo Cordova's bravery and service
with a state funeral, armed members of Los Zetas went to the fallen
5
hero's home and murdered his grieving family.
In total, drug-related violence has killed over 34,000 people in
6
Mexico since President Calder6n's 2006 crackdown on the cartels.
7
The violence is affecting neighboring countries as well. At the heart
of this violence is Los Zetas, Mexico's most dangerous trafficking
organization that has killed civilians and murdered government
officials in defiance of the Mexican state. 8 Given the pervasive
violence and the number of deaths, the Mexican drug war is a
situation of serious concern to the international community as a
whole, which could warrant attention from the International
Criminal Court (ICC). 9 Using a hypothetical prosecution, this Note
focuses on Los Zetas leader Heriberto Lazcano's potential ICC
liability stemming from a mass execution of seventy-two migrants by
Los Zetas in August 2010.10 On the charge of the Crime Against

3.
Ruth Maclean, Boost for Calderon's War on Drugs Trade as 'Boss of Bosses'
Is Shot Dead in Luxury Hideout, TIMES (London), Dec. 18, 2009, at 10.
4.
Elisabeth Malkin, Vengeful Fury in Drug War Chills, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23,
2009, at Al.
5.
Kellner & Pipitone, supra note 1, at 33.
6.
William Booth & Nick Miroff, U.S. Agents Are Shot, 1 Hurt in Mexico,
WASH. POST, Feb. 16, 2011, at A8; Jose De Cordoba & David Luhhow, In Mexico, Death
Toll in Drug War Hits Record, WALL ST. J., Jan. 13, 2011, at A8.
7.
See Booth & Miroff, supra note 6, at A8 (describing an attack on two U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agents between Monterrey and Mexico City);
Samuel Logan, Los Zetas: Evolution of a Criminal Organization, ISN SECURITY WATCH
(Mar. 11, 2009), http://www.isn.ethz.chisn/Current-Affairs/Security-Watch/Detail/
?lng=en&id=97554 (describing incidents of cartel violence in several U.S. states,
including Alabama, Georgia, Texas, and California); Q&A: Mexico's Drug-Related
Violence, BBC NEWS, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-10681249 (last
updated Jan. 12, 2012) (discussing the increase of drug-related violence on the U.S.
side of the U.S.-Mexico border).
8.
See George Grayson, Los Zetas: The Ruthless Army Spawned by a Mexican
Drug Cartel, FOREIGN POL'Y RES. INST. (May 2008), http://www.fpri.org/enotes/
200805.grayson.loszetas.html (detailing several Zetas-led attacks on government
officials); see also "Zetas" Drug Gang Grows, Sows Gear in Mexico, REUTERS, Oct. 12,
2010, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE69B3LZ20101012 (noting
the Zetas' responsibility for the murder of a gubernatorial candidate in Mexico and the
murder of seventy-two civilian migrants).
9.
See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 5(1), July 17,
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute] ("The jurisdiction of the Court shall
be limited to the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a
whole." (emphasis added)). Indeed, this past November, a group of Mexican activists
petitioned the ICC to investigate possible war crimes and crimes against humanity in
Mexico. Mexico Activists Seek ICC Investigation of Drugs War, BBC NEWS (Nov. 25,
2011), http://www.bbc.co.uklnews/world-latin-america-15899687.
10.
For detailed descriptions of the mass execution, see Ken Ellingwood, 72
Bodies Found at Mexican Ranch, Survivor Says Victims of Slaughter in Violence-
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Humanity of Extermination, this Note shows that the ICC Prosecutor
could prove the substantive crime and Lazcano's individual liability
for the purposes of obtaining an arrest warrant from the ICC PreTrial Chamber.
However, critical procedural roadblocks remain that could derail
the ICC's perceived legitimacy among its member states. The ICC's
complementarity regime is designed to balance the interests of state
sovereignty with the international community's collective interest in
putting an end to impunity for atrocities.'1 Language from the ICC
Statute's Preamble indicates that the drafters were acutely aware of
these competing interests. The Preamble declares that the states
parties enacted the statute "[r]ecognizingthat such grave crimes [as
12
atrocities] threaten the peace, security and well-being of the world,'
and that the parties are "[d]etermined to put an end to impunity
for ...these crimes.' 1 3 However, the Preamble also says that the
states parties "[r]ecall[] that it is the duty of every State to exercise
its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international
crimes,"'1 4 and "[e]mphasiz[e] that the International Court established
under this Statute shall be complementary to national criminal
jurisdictions."' 5 Codifed at Article 17 of the ICC Statute,
complementarity is widely referred to as the cornerstone principle of
16
the ICC.
Article 17's text, in relevant part, prohibits the ICC from
exercising jurisdiction over a case concurrently being investigated or
prosecuted domestically, unless the state is "unwilling or unable
genuinely to prosecute. '17 The framework gives states parties
primacy over the ICC in terms of prosecutorial jurisdiction over
alleged atrocities.18 Only when a state fails to exercise its duty to
prosecute or investigate, or undertakes that duty in a way consistent

Racked State Were Migrants Killed by the Drug Gang Zetas, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 25, 2010,
at 14; Dozens of Bodies Found at Mexico Ranch, BBC NEWS (Aug. 25, 2010),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america- 11080584; Survivor Details Massacre of
72 Migrants by Drug Cartel in Mexico, Fox NEWS (Aug. 25, 2010),
http://www.foxnews.com/world/2010/08/25/mexican-government-migrants-dead-ranchkilled-zetas-drug-gang.
11.
Nidal Nabil Jurdi, The ProsecutorialInterpretationof the Complementarity
Principle: Does It Really Contribute to Ending Impunity on the National Level?, 10
INT'L CRIM. L. REv. 73, 73-74 (2010); see also Markus Benzing, The Complementarity
Regime of the International Criminal Court: International Criminal Justice Between
State Sovereignty and the Fight Against Impunity, 7 MAX PLANCK Y.B. UNITED
NATIONS L. 591, 595-97 (2003).
12.
Rome Statute, supra note 9, pmbl. para. 3.
13.
Id. pmbl. para. 5.
14.
Id. pmbl. para. 6.
15.
Id. pmbl. para. 10.
16.
Benzing, supra note 11, at 593.
17.
Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 17(1)(a).
18.
Julio Bacio Terracino, National Implementation of ICC Crimes: Impact of
National Jurisdictionsand the ICC, 5 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 421, 421 (2007).
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with an unwillingness or inability to genuinely prosecute, is the ICC
permitted to exercise jurisdiction. 19 Accordingly, the ICC is said to be
complementary to domestic prosecutions, and merely serves to fill in
gaps where domestic prosecutions are inadequate.
As a result, the definitions of "unwilling to prosecute" and
"unable to prosecute" are critically important to an effectively
functioning complementarity regime. 20 While Article 17 provides
some guidelines for determining unwillingness or inability, these
guidelines are very broad and leave many ambiguities. 21 The
situation in Mexico provides an opportunity to examine the scope of
these ambiguous criteria.2 2 Mexico, it turns out, lacks a domestic
codification of Crimes Against Humanity.2 3 Thus, Mexico cannot
prosecute conduct meeting the elements of Crimes Against Humanity
as such a crime, and may only prosecute such conduct as an "ordinary
crime"; for example, domestic murder. 24 The critical question thus
becomes whether Mexico is "unable to prosecute" under Article 17,
given that it cannot charge the perpetrator with the relevant
international crime. 2 5 If the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber were to hold that
Mexico is unable to prosecute, the ICC would then be permitted to try

19.
See Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 17(1)(a) (determining that a case is
admissible before the ICC only when a state is "unwilling or unable genuinely" to
investigate or prosecute a given case).
20.
See Benzing, supra note 11, at 601 ("However, all cases and situations
before the Court have to be carefully measured against the factors mentioned in article
17 so as not to circumvent the requirements established in article 17, which reflect the
above mentioned compromise between state sovereignty and the effective
administration of justice.").
See Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 17(2)-(3) (broadly defining the factors
21.
of "unwillingness" and "inability"); see also Gregory McNeal, ICC Inability
Determinations in Light of the Dujail Case, 39 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 325, 327-28
(2007) (discussing the ambiguity of the inability criteria).
22.
Compare Jann K. Kleffner, The Impact of Complementarity on National
Implementation of Substantive InternationalCriminal Law, 1 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 86,
89 (2003) (arguing that inadequate substantive laws can render a case admissible
before the ICC), with Michael A. Newton, Comparative Complementarity: Domestic
Jurisdiction Consistent with the Rome Statute of the InternationalCriminal Court, 167
MIL. L. REV. 20, 70-72 (2001) (arguing that the ICC should not hold a case admissible
based solely on the nature of the crime charged by the state). See generally Lisa
Laplante, The Domesticationof InternationalCriminal Law: A Proposalfor Expanding
the InternationalCriminal Court's Sphere of Influence, 43 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 635,
660-61 (2010) (pointing out that scholars often debate the issue of ordinary crimes as it
relates to inability under the ICC Statute).
23.
Ramiro Garcia Falconi, The Codification of Crimes Against Humanity in the
Domestic Legislationof Latin American States, 10 INT'L CRIM. L. REV. 453, 458 (2010).
24.
See Terracino, supra note 18, at 428 (using Colombia as an example to
illustrate prosecution of Crimes Against Humanity under its domestic laws).
See Michael A. Newton, The Chameleon Court: The Changing Face of the
25.
ICC, 27 LAW CONTEXT J. 5, 16 (2009) ("It is unclear in the circumstances following
prosecution for another formulation of the underlying offense under domestic law
whether the prosecution of what is termed an 'ordinary crime' would suffice to make a
case inadmissible in the ICC framework.").
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the case. Such a result would ensure that the crime would be
prosecuted as the atrocity it is, serving the global humanitarian
interest in prosecuting such horrific conduct as an international
crime.2 6 But in doing so the ICC would obligate states parties to
charge any act potentially meeting the elements of an ICC crime as
an international crime, just to ensure they retain jurisdiction. 2 7 This
would call into question whether the ICC is truly complementary to
domestic prosecutions. On the other hand, if it were to hold that
Mexico is able to prosecute, the ICC would respect Mexico's right to
prosecute crimes occurring on its sovereign territory. 28 But this would
allow what is substantively an atrocity crime to be prosecuted as an
ordinary crime, thus trivializing the nature of the crime and aiding
impunity.29 Given this context, if the ICC initiates an investigation in
Mexico, severe consequences could follow for the nature of Article 17's
inability definition, and by extension, the ICC's complementarity
regime. This Note uses the hypothetical prosecution of Los Zetas
leader Heriberto Lazcano to address the oft-debated, but still
unanswered question of whether ordinary crimes prosecutions
amount to an inability to prosecute under Article 17 of the ICC
30
Statute.
This Note argues that, assuming Mexico would pursue charges
against Lazcano, Mexico is not unable to investigate and prosecute
Lazcano under the ICC statute, despite its lack of a domestic
codification of Crimes Against Humanity as defined under
international law.Si The ICC would improperly usurp Mexico's
sovereign right to prosecute offenses occurring within its territory if it
held Lazcano's case admissible based on Mexico's inability to charge
him with an international crime. In addition, this Note posits that the
ICC would damage its foundational complementarity regime if it were
to categorically hold that a state is "unable to prosecute" under
Article 17 when it lacks the domestic implementation of an ICC
crime.

26.
See Kleffner, supra note 22, at 93 (envisioning the ICC as a complement to
national jurisdiction in order to ensure adequate prosecution of such crimes).
27.
See Terracino, supra note 18, at 438 (describing how several delegations
during the Rome Conference viewed an exception to ordinary crimes prosecutions, such
as the ones found in the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) statutes, as creating
an undesirable domestic obligation to characterize acts as international crimes).
28.
See Newton, supra note 25, at 17 (noting that because the United Kingdom
enacted a law "which mirrored the Rome Statute, the UK was able to try its own
citizens on its own soil instead of placing them in the hands of the ICC").
29.
See Benzing, supra note 11, at 615 (noting that the ICTY's decision in
Prosecutorv. Tadic invoked a similar concern for "trivialization of crimes").
30.
See, e.g., Laplante, supra note 22, at 660-61 (noting that an ongoing debate
exists as to inability under the Rome Statute).
31.
Falconi, supranote 23, at 458.

2012]

A COMPLEMENTARITY CONUNDRUM

Part II gives a brief background on Los Zetas and the particular
conduct serving as the actus reus for this hypothetical crime, before
moving into a discussion of the elements of the charged crime and
Lazcano's individual liability. Part III is the heart of this Note, as it
discusses Mexico's potential inability to prosecute the case under
Article 17, which of course would determine whether the ICC could
exercise jurisdiction over the case. 32 Part IV suggests that the proper
method of criminal sanctions against Lazcano is a domestic
prosecution in Mexico, and offers a framework under which the ICC
could analyze concurrent ordinary crimes prosecutions for
admissibility purposes. Part V concludes, and suggests that the facts
pertaining to the admissibility of this hypothetical particular
prosecution are applicable to other ICC prosecutions related to drug
violence in Mexico.

II. ELEMENTS OF THE PROSECUTION
This Note's hypothetical prosecution focuses, substantively
speaking, on Los Zetas leader Heriberto Lazcano's liability for an
attack on a group of Central and South American migrants in August
2010 that has become known as the Tamaulipas Massacre. 33 For this
conduct, Lazcano could be charged with the Crime Against Humanity
of Extermination under Article 7(1)(b) of the statute. 34 To issue an
arrest warrant, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber need only have
"reasonable grounds to believe" that a crime within the Court's
jurisdiction has been committed. Accordingly, to successfully get
Lazcano's case before the ICC, the Prosecutor need only demonstrate
reasonable grounds to believe that the elements of the crime are
35
met.
As a preliminary matter, this Note assumesthe nonexistence of
an armed conflict in Mexico between government authorities and the

32.
This Note ignores Mexico's potential inability to prosecute based on
insufficient due process or fair trial guarantees in its domestic law, instead focusing on
the inability issues stemming from practical concerns regarding corruption and
extortion, and more significantly, Mexico's failure to implement Crimes Against
Humanity. This "due process" approach to inability is one that may prove to carry
weight with the Court. See McNeal, supra note 21, at 332 (explaining the ICC's
apparent move toward a due process approach to inability under Article 17(3)). But as
the current inability statute reads, the due process inquiry has no legal basis with
respect to the inability. See Kevin Jon Heller, The Shadow Side of Complementarity:
The Effect of Article 17 of the Rome Statute on National Due Process, 17 CRIM. L.F. 255,
257 (2006) (arguing that nothing in the Article 17(3) as it currently reads permits the
lack of due process standards as grounds for an inability determination).
33.
Cf. Mark Stevenson & E. Edwardo Castillo, Drug Cartel Blamed for Death
of 72 Migrants, VIRGINIAN PILOT, Aug. 26, 2010, at A5 (describing the cartel's
involvement in the mass killing).
34.
Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 7(1)(b).
35.
Id. art. 58(1)(a).

606

VANDERBILT/OURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

IVOL. 45.599

drug cartels. An armed conflict exists under international law when
there is "protracted armed violence between governmental authorities
and organized armed groups or between such groups within a
state."36 However, the violence in Mexico is not between government
authorities and organized armed groups, nor is it between two
distinct organized armed groups. 37 The government fights the cartels,
and the cartels simultaneously fight each other. 38 The conflict lacks
two clear, diametrically opposed sides, and is instead a mishmash of
competing factions and competing interests. 39 The cartels do not wish
to take power and would prefer the government leave them alone to
run their narcotics businesses. 40 Before President Calder6n initiated
his crackdown on the drug cartels in 2006, the cartels had an
41
understanding with the government and rarely instigated violence.
Thus, drug violence in Mexico is not one large, protracted armed
conflict between parties participating in the conflict, but a collection
of violent incidents committed by various individual actors against
other various individual actors. It is with the established absence of
an armed conflict that this Note turns to the substantive analysis of
the crime.
A. The Act in Question: The TamaulipasMassacre
The Los Zetas Cartel is widely considered the most dangerous
and tactically advanced criminal trafficking organization currently
operating in Mexico. 42 It formed in 1997 from deserters of the Grupo
Aeromovil de Fuerzas Especiales (GAFE), the Mexican military's elite
Special Air Mobile Forces Group. 43 The powerful Gulf Cartel, long
considered one of the two dominant drug trafficking organizations in

36.
Prosecutor v. Boskoski & Tarculovski, Case No. IT-04-82-T, Judgment,
175 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 10, 2008).
See Fred Burton & Scott Stewart, Mexico: The Third War, WORLD MAG.
37.
(Feb. 18, 2009), http://www.worldmag.com/webextra/15051 (describing the three "wars"
in Mexico: the war between the cartels, the war between the government and the
cartels, and the war on civilians, which takes form namely in kidnapping and human
smuggling operations).
Id.
38.
See id. (describing the goals of the various players in the "wars").
39.
40.
Brad Freden, The COIN Approach to Mexican Drug Cartels: Square Peg in
a Round Hole, SMALL WARS J. (Dec. 27, 2011), http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/thecoin-approach-to-mexican-drug-cartels-square-peg-in-a-round-hole.
Grace Wyler, Former Mexican Governor Admits Past Presidents Controlled
41.
Drug Trade, Bus. INSIDER (Feb. 28, 2011), http://www.businessinsider.com/formermexican-governor-admits-pri-presidents-controlled-drug-trade-2011-2.
42.
Grayson, supra note 8; Michael Ware, Los Zetas Called Mexico's Most
Dangerous Drug Cartel, CNN WORLD (Aug. 6, 2009), http://www.cnn.com/2009/
"Zetas" Drug Gang Grows,
WORLD/americas/08/06/mexico.drug.cartels/index.html;
supra note 8.
COLLEEN COOK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34215, MEXICO'S DRUG
43.
CARTELS 10 (2008).
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Mexico, recruited these ex-GAFEs as its enforcement, paramilitary
arm. 44 However, the Gulf Cartel has taken a major hit since
President Calder6n's 2006 crackdown, most notably with the
November 2010 death of leader Antonio Ezekiel Cardenas Guillen in
a shootout with Mexican military forces. 45 In early 2010, the Zetas
split from the Gulf Cartel and began independently running drugsmuggling operations.4 6 Led by ex-GAFE Heriberto "The Executioner"
Lazcano, 4 7 the Zetas have steadily gained territory and influence as a
4
result of their superior tactical abilities and weaponry. 8
The Zetas are responsible for many attacks on civilians in
northern Mexico. 49 Some of the heaviest violence centers in the state
of Tamaulipas, ground zero for the Zetas' turf war against their
former employer, the Gulf Cartel. 50 One particular mass execution in
Tamaulipas against seventy-two Central and South American
migrants serves as the conduct element of this hypothetical
prosecution. Unfortunately, these migrant attacks are a regular
occurrence in Mexico. 51 After drug trafficking itself, migrant extortion
is the primary source of income for the cartels. 52 Mexican officials
note that migrant groups are often targeted by the cartels as
potential drug mules for smuggling drugs into the United States, or
as a source of cash or ransom. 53 Other reports show that the cartels,

44.
Grayson, supranote 8.
45.
Tracy Wilkinson, Mexico Drug Kingpin Slain in Fierce Gun Battle with
Military, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2OlO/nov/06/world/la-fgmexico-druglord-20101106.
46.
Gulf Cartel Split with Zetas Public: Gulf Cartel Goes Public on Break-up
with Former Allies
Los Zetas, BORDERLAND
BEAT (Mar.
10,
2010),
http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2010/03/gulf-cartel-split-with-zetas-public.html; Mexico
Drug Lord Death May Aide Zeta Cartel's Rise, MSNBC POL. (Nov. 6, 2010),
http://bltwy.msnbc.msn.com/politics/mexico-drug-lord-death-may-aid-zeta-cartels-rise1667064.story ("Former allies of the Gulf Cartel, the Zetas went independent earlier
this year ...").
47.
Grayson, supra note 8.
48.
See John P. Sullivan & Samuel Logan, Los Zetas: Massacres,
Assassinations, and Infantry Tactics, COUNTER TERRORIST (Nov. 24, 2010),
http://www.homelandl.com/domesticinternational-terrorism/articles/913612-LosZetas-Massacres-Assassinations-and-Infantry-Tactics (giving general background on
the Zetas, including tactical approaches and resources).
49.
Id.; see Tracy Wilkinson, Caught Behind Enemy Lines, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 12,
2010, at 32 (discussing the impact on civilians of the turf war between the Zetas and
the Gulf Cartel).
50.
Ellingwood, supra note 10; Wilkinson, supra note 49, at 32.
51.
David Agren, Cartels Target Migrants in Wave of Kidnappings, UNIVERSE,
Nov. 15, 2009, at 10; Claudia Morales & Jorge Nunez, Big Business for Mexican
Cartels: Kidnapping Central American Migrants, NEW AM. MEDIA (Sept. 1, 2010),
http://newamericamedia.org/2010/09/big-business-for-mexican.cartels-kidnappingcentral-american-migrants.php.
52.
Agren, supra note 51.
53.
See Lizbeth Diaz, Mexico Cartels Kidnap, Kill Migrants Headed to U.S.,
REUTERS, Sept. 22, 2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE
58L3B420090922?pageNumber=2 (discussing migrants used as drug carriers); Morales
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in particular the Zetas, use migrants for human trafficking
purposes. 54 A study by the Mexican National Human Rights
Commission shows that at least 1,600 migrants are kidnapped in
Mexico monthly, which equates to nearly 20,000 annually. 55 In the
particular incident in question, armed members of the Zetas stopped
the migrants as they attempted to enter the United States in August
2010.56 One survivor claimed that the Zetas offered the migrants
work,5 7 while others reported that the migrants were told to pay
extortion fees. 58 When the migrants refused, the execution
commenced. 59 Fifty-eight men and fourteen women were found shot
60
to death roughly ninety miles south of the Texas border.
This particular attack would be the preferred actus reus for the
ICC Prosecutor for two reasons. First, the attack-dubbed the
Tamualipas Massacre-is considered the largest single act of cartel
violence since the drug war began in 2006.61 As a result, it received a
significant amount of international media attention. 6 2 Second and
more importantly, two migrants survived the execution. 63 As a result,

& Nunez, supra note 51 (discussing migrants held for ransom); Murdered Bodies Found
in Mexico 'Were Migrants,' BBC NEWS (Aug. 25, 2010), http://www.bbc.co.uklnews/
world-latin-america-11090563 (discussing migrants extorted for their cash).
54.
JUNE S. BEITTEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40582, MEXICO'S DRUGRELATED VIOLENCE 6 (2009); BLAS NUNEZ-NETO, ALISON SISKIN & STEPHEN VINA,
CONG RESEARCH SERV., RL33097, BORDER SECURITY: APPREHENSIONS OF "OTHER THAN
MEXICAN" ALIENS 12 (2005); see also Los Zetas, BORDERLAND BEAT (Sept. 12, 2009),
http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2009/09/los-zetas.html (detailing the Zetas' human
smuggling operation).
55.
MEXICAN NAT'L COMM'N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, SPECIAL REPORT OF THE
HUMAN RIGHTS NATIONAL COMMISSION OVER THE KIDNAPPING AGAINST MIGRANTS 5-6
(finding 9,758 victims of migrant kidnappings during a six month period from
September 2008 to February 2009).
56.
William Booth, Survivor: Drug Gang Massacred 72 Migrants in Northern
Mexico, WASH. POST, Aug. 25, 2010, at A7.
57.
No Safe Passage: Add Drug Gangs to the Long List of Dangers Facing
Migrants, ECONOMIST, Sept. 11, 2010, at 36; Murdered Bodies Found in Mexico 'Were
Migrants,'supra note 53.
58.
Booth, supra note 56; Randal Archibold, Victims of Massacre in Mexico
Said to Be Migrants, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2010, at A4; Daniel Hernandez, Survivor of
Migrant Massacre Returns to Ecuador, LA PLAZA (Aug. 30, 2010, 1:04 PM),
http:/llatimesblogs.latimes.comlaplaza/2010/08/migrants-bodies-mexico-braziltamaulipas.html.
59.
Archibold, supranote 58.
60.
Id.
61.
No Safe Passage, supranote 57.
62.
For examples of media attention, see Archibold, supranote 58; 72 Bodies Found
in Mexico Ranch, HINDUSTAN TIMES (Aug. 26, 2010), http://www.hindustantimes.com/72bodies-found-in-Mexico-ranch/Articlel-591920.aspx; 72 Bodies Found on Ranch in Mexico,
RTE NEWS (Aug. 25, 2010), http:l/www.rte.ie/news/20100825/mexico.html; Robin Emmott,
Drug Hitmen Dump 72 Bodies at Mexican Ranch, REUTERS, Aug. 25, 2010, available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6702NF20100826; Murdered Bodies Found in
Mexico 'Were Migrants,' supra note 57; Survivor Details Massacre of 72 Migrants by Drug
Cartel in Mexico, supranote 10.
63.
No Safe Passage,supra note 53.
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the
eyewitness survivors can recount the events and verify6 that
4
executioners identified themselves as members of Los Zetas.
B. Elements of the CrimeAgainst Humanity of Extermination
The Crime Against Humanity of Extermination is defined as an
act of extermination "committed as part of a widespread or systematic
attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the
attack. '65 The statute defines the act of extermination as "the
intentional infliction of conditions of life... calculated to bring about
the destruction of part of a population." 66 There is little doubt that
lining up a group of civilians and gunning them down at close range
is "calculated to bring about the destruction" of that particular
population. However, to prove that the conduct constitutes the Crime
Against Humanity of Extermination, the Prosecutor must prove four
distinct elements: (1) that the perpetrator killed one or more persons
(the conduct element), (2) that the killing occurred as part of a mass
killing of members of a civilian population, (3) that the conduct was
committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed
against a civilian population; and (4) that the perpetrator knew or
intended the act to be part of a widespread or systematic attack
67
against a civilian population.
1.

Conduct Element

The first element is the conduct itself, which is described in Part
II.A above. To satisfy this element, the perpetrator must
intentionally 68 "kill[] one or more persons, including by inflicting
conditions of life calculated to bring about the destruction of part of a
population. ' 69 As discussed above, the Zetas slaughtered seventy-two
people with direct gunfire, so the conduct element is not problematic
70
in this case.

Survivor Details Massacre of 72 Migrants by Drug Cartel in Mexico, supra
64.
note 10.
Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 7(1).
65.
66.
Id. art. 7(2)(b).
67.
Int'l Criminal Court [ICC], Elements of Crimes art. 7(1)(b)(1), ICCASP/1/3(part II-B) (Sept. 9, 2002) [hereinafter ICC Elements].
Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 30.
68.
69.
ICC Elements, supranote 67, art. 7(1)(b)(1).
70.
See supra Part. JI.A (describing the Tamaulipas Massacre).
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Mass Killing and Civilian Population

The second element of the Crime Against Humanity of
Extermination requires that the killing occur "as part of, a mass
killing of members of a civilian population. '71 This requires defining
both "mass killing" and "civilian population." The decisions of the ad
hoc tribunals are informative here, as they carry significant
precedential weight in the ICC. 72 In the Stakic judgment, the Appeals
Chamber for the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) held that there is no numerical threshold for a "mass killing"
under customary international law. 7 3 In Krajisnik, the ICTY Trial
Chamber determined that ten separate incidents involving the
execution of between twenty and seventy people each independently
constituted an act of extermination. 74 Consequently, an act of mass
killing does not require hundreds of victims under established
international criminal law jurisprudence. 75 Thus, the simultaneous
execution of seventy-two individuals easily satisfies the "mass killing"
requirement.
"Civilian population" is also defined broadly in international
criminal jurisprudence. 76 The ICTY held that the Prosecutor need
only show that enough civilians were attacked to convince the Court
that the attack was directed against a "population" rather than
against arbitrarily chosen individuals.7 7 Put another way, members
of the population must share some feature that makes them the
targets of the attack, as opposed to simply being a random assembly

ICC Elements, supra note 67, art. 7(l)(b)(1).
71.
See Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, Decision
72.
Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the
73-89 nn. 97-111 (June 15, 2009) (citing numerous ICTY and ICTR
Prosecutor,
cases in laying out the elements of Crimes Against Humanity).
260 (Int'l
Prosecutor v. Stakic, Case No. IT-97-24-A, Appeals Judgment,
73.
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 22, 2006). Also note that if the Pre-Trial
Chamber is not satisfied that the killing of seventy-two migrants qualifies as a "mass
killing," the chamber is free to amend the charges to the crime against humanity of
murder, which does not require the "mass killing" element. ICC Elements, supra note
67, art. 7(1)(a). However, the Prosecutor may not charge both murder and
extermination because cumulative charges are only permitted when each charge has a
materially distinct element that the other crime does not contain, which is not the case
with the crimes against humanity of murder and extermination.
720-21
Prosecutor v. Krajisnik, Case No. IT-00-39-T, Trial Judgment,
74.
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 27, 2006).
Cf. id. (determining that incidents involving between twenty and seventy
75.
victims is sufficient to constitute a "mass killing").
Prosecutor v.Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Trial Judgment, 643 (Int'l Crim.
76.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997).
77.
Prosecutor v. Kordic & Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Appeals Judgment,
95 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 17, 2004).
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of individuals that were arbitrarily attacked. 78 Within the ICC,
Crimes Against Humanity may be directed against any civilian
population. 79 Consequently, Article 7 extends to all civilian groups
that have some common element making them a nonrandom
collection of individuals.8 0 The migrant group in the Tamaulipas
Massacre is a civilian population within this broad definition. These
seventy-two individuals were not selected arbitrarily, but were
targeted as an entire group of migrants for the purposes of human
trafficking, labor, or ransoms, as the survivors' eyewitness testimony
81
would confirm.
3.

Widespread or Systematic Attack Directed Against a Civilian
Population

The third element the Prosecutor must prove is that the conduct
was committed as part of a "widespread or systematic attack directed
against a civilian population."8 2 Substantively, this third element
separates a Crime Against Humanity from a simple domestic
criminal charge of extermination or murder. 83 Within the phrase
''widespread or systematic directed attack against a civilian
population," there are three relevant subelements: (1) widespread, (2)
systematic, and (3) attack against a civilian population.8 4 Each
subelement is examined in turn below.
First, it is important to note that the phrase "widespread or
systematic attack" is disjunctive.8 5 Thus the attack against a civilian
population may be either widespread or systematic; it need not be
both.8 6 Furthermore, both terms exclude isolated or random acts of

78.
See Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23/1-A, Appeals Judgment,
154 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 12, 2002) (noting that the
accused mistreated Muslim girls and women "with the intent of discriminating against
[them] because they were Muslim'),-see also PETER T. BURNS, INT'L CTR. FOR CRIMINAL
LAW REFORM & CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY, ASPECT OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY AND
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 7 (2007).

79.
Rome Statute, supranote 9, art. 7(1). •
80.
Prosecutor v. Katanga & Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07,
Decision on Confirmation of Charges, 399 (Sept. 30, 2008).
81.
Booth, supra note 56.
82.
ICC Elements, supra note 67, art. 7(1)(b)(3).
83.
See Darryl Robinson, Defining "Crimes Against Humanity" at the Rome
Conference, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 43, 48-49 (1999) (noting that the policy element within
the "attack directed against a civilian population" element of crimes against humanity
gives "these otherwise domestic crimes the requisite 'international element"').
84.
ICC Elements, supra note 67, art. 7(1)(b)(3).
85.
Id.
86.
See Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 7(1) (also using the disjunctive phrase
"widespread or systematic" (emphasis added)); see also Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo,
Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome
Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor, 82 (June 15, 2009) (noting that the terms
"widespread" and "systematic" are presented in the alternative).
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violence. 8 7 While the Rome Statute itself defines neither term, they
are well defined in the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals. 88 While
the Prosecutor could likely satisfy either "widespread" or
"systematic," systematic is a more comfortable fit for the Tamaulipas
Massacre. A systematic attack refers to the organized nature of an
attack resulting in a pattern of crimes or methodical plan.8 9 There is
lack of randomness, and thus a purpose to the attacks, either from a
plan to commit such attacks, or from the nonaccidental, repetitive
nature of the attacks that implicitly establish such a plan.90 Thus, a
systematic attack has a "plan or policy" element to it. 91 The Blaskic
Trial Chamber identified four elements necessary to prove a
systematic attack through this policy element: (1) a political objective
or plan, or an ideology, broadly speaking, to destroy, persecute, or
weaken the community; (2) perpetration of a large-scale act against
civilians or the repeated and continuous commission of inhumane
acts linked to each other; (3) use of significant public or private
resources, military or otherwise; and (4) implication of high-level
political or military authorities in establishing the plan.9 2 However,
Blaskic also held that it is not necessary to demonstrate an express
plan or policy. 93 The court may examine the means, methods,
resources, and results of the attack, in the context of the particular
civilian population attacked, to determine whether the attack was
systematic. 94 Evidence of organized, patterned, or recurring attacks
of a similar nature implicitly demonstrate a plan and thus a
systematic attack. 95

87.
Prosecutor v. Katanga & Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07,
Decision on Confirmation of Charges, 394 (Sept. 30, 2008).
88.
See Prosecutor v. Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Trial Judgment,
146 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003) (defining "widespread"); Prosecutor
v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Trial Judgment, 648 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia May 7, 1997) (defining "systematic").
89.
Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, 648.
90.
Prosecutor v. Kordic & Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Appeals Judgment,
666 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 12, 2002).
91.
See id. (noting that a repeated pattern commonly demonstrates the
"systematic" nature of the acts); Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T,
648 (stating that
systematicity requires "a pattern or methodical plan").
92.
Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Trial Judgment,
203 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 3, 2000); see also Prosecutor v. Kordic &
Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Trial Judgment, 179 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Feb. 26, 2001) (applying the four-part Blaskic test for a systematic attack).
93.
Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T,
204; see also Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-T,
147 ("[T]here is no requirement under customary international law that the attack be
connected to a policy or plan. Evidence of a plan or policy may, however, be used in
showing that the attack was widespread or systematic.").
94.
Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23/1-A, Appeals Judgment,
95
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 12, 2002).
95.
Id.; Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, 648; see also Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T,
204 (listing potential events and circumstances under which a court may base a
finding of a systematic attack).
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There is ample evidence that this attack satisfies the four-part
Blaskic test. The objective for the attacks is clear, as migrants
provide a source of labor as drug mules, meaning that they are forced
to smuggle drugs into the United States.9 6 They also provide a good
source of cash via kidnapping ransoms or human smuggling
operations.9 7 While these are not political objectives as required
under a strict reading of Blaskic, the cartels are not political
organizations.9 8 They are business operations that rationally want to
strengthen their operations vis-A-vis the government and each
other, 99 and they use migrants as a means to that end. 100
Regarding the large-scale and connected nature of the attacks,
the Mexican National Commission for Human Rights estimated that
nearly 10,000 migrants are kidnapped every six months in Mexico,
with 75 percent going unreported, as most migrants are
undocumented and prefer not to risk exposure to authorities. 10 1 These
findings reasonably demonstrate that these attacks are large-scale,
repeated, and organized, and are not isolated incidents of violence.10 2
As to the use of resources prong, the attacks necessarily require the
cartels' private resources, and the objectives of the attacks even
implicate the resources of the migrants themselves. 10 3 Finally, the
repetitive and patterned nature of the attacks gives rise to a

96.
See Diaz, supra note 53 ("The U.S. Border Patrol says it is now common to
see immigrants acting as drug mules.").
97.
Los Zetas, supra note 46; see also Cook, supra note 43, at 7-8 (reporting in
2008, before the Zetas split from the Gulf Cartel, that the Gulf Cartel was actively
involved in human smuggling).
98.
Contrary to the drug war in Mexico, the Blaskic case arose in the context of
political and ethnic conflict in the Balkans. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T,
660. In
laying out the test for a systematic attack, the Blaskic Trial Chamber clearly stated
that the elements of the test were phrased to specifically cater to the case at hand,
which was of course, a political conflict. See id. 203 ("The systematic character refers
to four elements which for the purposes of this case may be expressed as follows ...
(emphasis added)).
99.
Ware, supra note 42 (reporting that the Zetas maintain business ledgers
and have quarterly meetings); see also Jennifer Griffin & Laura Prabucki, America's
Third War: Mapping the Drug Cartels, Fox NEWS (Nov. 19, 2010),
http://www.foxnews.com/us/2010/11/19/americas-third-war-mapping-mexican-drug.
cartels (stating that Mexican drug trafficking is a $40 billion business).
100.
See Diaz, supranote 53.
101.

MEXICAN NAT'L COMM'N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 55, at 5-6; Jose

Luis Sierra, Mexico Dispatch: A Country Turned Upside-Down, PBS NEWSHOUR (Dec.
29, 2010), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundownl2OlO/12/mexico.dispatch.4.html.
102.
See Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, 467 (quoting from a witness's statement
that "we saw that the same type of events were taking place at the same time period in
different locations, and it would be impossible, in my opinion, for this to have been
carried out by uncontrolled groups").
103.
See Diaz, supra note 53 (noting that migrants are used to smuggle drugs
across the border); Morales & Nunez, supra note 51 (reporting that the cartels use
migrants to extort ransoms from the migrants' families).
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04
reasonable belief that high-level cartel authorities are involved.'
Given the amount of migrants being kidnapped or killed in Mexico,
and given the Zetas' extensive paramilitary capabilities and their
presence along trafficking routes, there are reasonable grounds to
believe that a prosecutorial investigation would uncover many more
10 5
incidents of migrant attacks perpetrated by Los Zetas.
To prove an attack against a civilian population, the Prosecutor
0 6
must show the actual existence of an organizational plan or policy.'
Article 7(2)(a) defines an "attack directed against any civilian
population" as "conduct involving multiple commissions of
acts... against any civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance
of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack ....
Therefore, the Prosecutor must show that the state or nonstate actor
had a policy to commit the attack in question. However, there is no
requirement of a formal, explicit, or stated organizational plan or
policy.108 The court may infer a plan or policy from the way the acts
are committed and from other circumstantial evidence.1 0 9 Evidence of
repeated, patterned attacks that target migrants for tangible
purposes, as discussed above, would implicitly demonstrate a policy to
commit the attacks. 110 Thus, the prosecution would clear the "attack
directed against a civilian population" hurdle for purposes of an
arrest warrant.1 1 1

4.

Mens Rea

The fourth and final element is the perpetrator's mental state, or
mens rea.1 12 This element applies only to the direct perpetrators of
the crime, and not to Lazcano, whose liability would be determined
separately under command responsibility doctrine discussed in Part

104.
See Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T,
467 ("The planned nature and, in
particular, the fact all these units acted in a perfectly coordinated manner presupposes
in fact that those troops were responding to a single command ....
").
105.
See Ken Ellingwood, Mexico Says Zetas Drug Gang Figure Arrested, L.A.
TIMES (Jan. 19, 2011), http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-mexicozetas-20110119,0,4599136.story (noting that the Zetas have branched into migrant
smuggling, kidnapping, and extortion since breaking from their role as Gulf Cartel
hitmen).
106.
Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 7(2)(a).
107.
Id.
108.
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Trial Judgment, 653 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997).
109.
Id.; see also ICC Elements, supra note 67, general intro. 3 ("Existence of
intent and knowledge can be inferred from relevant facts and circumstances.").
110.
See Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Trial Judgment, 204 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 3, 2000) (holding that a plan or policy can
be inferred from, among other things, "temporally and geographically repeated and coordinated military offensives," and "the scale of the acts of violence perpetrated ... .
111.
Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 58(1)(a).
112.
ICC Elements, supra note 67 art. 7(1)(b)(4).
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II.C below (unless of course the Prosecutor could prove Lazcano was a
direct perpetrator)." 3 To satisfy this element, the perpetrator must
know or intend that the act be part of a widespread or systematic
attack against a civilian population.'1 4 However, the perpetrator need
not know all characteristics of the attack, nor must he or she know
the specific details of the plan or policy." 5 The perpetrator's
knowledge of the broader attack may be inferred from circumstantial
evidence, such as the perpetrator's position in the organization's
hierarchy or role in the broader campaign.1 1 6 Given the repetitive,
purposeful nature of the attacks and the scale on which they
reportedly occur, 11 7 it is reasonable to believe that the perpetrators of
part of a
the Tamaulipas Massacre knew that their conduct was
8
larger systematic policy to attack and extort migrants."
C. Individual Liability: Command Responsibility
Given the particular circumstances, absent evidence that
Heriberto Lazcano was himself at the scene of the crime or that he
gave a specific order to execute these seventy-two migrants-evidence
that is all but impossible to ascertain even if true1 9-the Prosecutor
would have to establish Lazcano's liability for this execution through
command responsibility. 120 Command responsibility provides liability
for a military commander or a "person effectively acting as military
commander" when the commander's subordinates commit a crime

Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, Decision Pursuant
113.
89
to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor,
(June 15, 2009).
Id.
114.
ICC Elements, supra note 67, art. 7 intro. 2; see also Bemba Gombo, Case
115.
No. ICC-01/05-01/08, 88.
116.
Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision on
Confirmation of Charges, 402 (Sept. 30, 2008).
See MEXIcAN NAT'L COMM'N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 55, at 9
117.
(discovering 9,758 migrant kidnappings over a six month period in 2009); Diaz, supra
note 53 (reporting that migrants are often targeted for use as "drug mules").
118.
See Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 58(1)(a) (requiring "reasonable
grounds to believe" that a crime was committed before the Court authorizes an arrest
warrant).
119.
If the prosecutor can obtain evidence demonstrating that Lazcano was
present at the scene of the execution or ordered the execution himself, then the
relevant mode of liability would be found within Article 25 of the ICC Statute, which
deals with individual criminal responsibility. See Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 25(3)
(discussing various methods of individual liability). However, this Note assumes such
evidence is not present, given the fact that in every account this author has come
across, there is not a shred of evidence linking specific individuals to acts of violence
committed by Los Zetas. See, e.g., Ellingwood, supra note 105 (referring to perpetrators
as "gunmen").
See Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 28(a) (codifying command
120.
responsibility).
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within the ICC's jurisdiction. 12 1 The Zetas are not a state-sponsored
122
organization, and thus Lazcano is not a military commander.
However, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber held that a person effectively
operating as a military commander includes a superior who exercises
authority over "irregular forces (nongovernment forces) such as rebel
groups, [or] paramilitary units.'' 123 Given that the Zetas are exSpecial Forces, have the capacity to run sophisticated armed
operations, and have a history as a cartel enforcement arm, the Zetas
certainly qualify as a paramilitary organization. 124 Accordingly,
Lazcano would be a person effectively acting as a military
125
commander.
Once the prosecution demonstrates that Lazcano is equivalent to
a military commander, it would also have to show that the
commander (1) had "effective control" over the subordinates, (2) knew
or should have known that the subordinates were committing or were
about to commit crimes, and (3) failed to prevent or repress the
126
commission of the crimes.
1.

Effective Control

Effective control is determined by a commander's ability to
prevent, punish, repress, or submit the offense committed by
subordinates to authorities. 127 The Bemba Pre-Trial Chamber listed
several factors contributing to effective control: official position,
power to issue orders, ability to ensure compliance with issued orders,
capacity to order forces to engage into hostile environments or
withdraw from hostilities, and capacity to make changes to the
command structure or enact personnel changes. 128 Lazcano's effective
control is demonstrable through his official position as the leader of

121.
Id.
122.
See Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, Decision
Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the
Prosecutor, 408 (June 15, 2009) (holding that a "military commander" is one with de
jure authority, or "legally appointed" authority).
123.
Id. 410.
124.
"Paramilitary" is defined simply as "of, relating to, or being a group of
civilians organized in a military fashion ..." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE
DICTIONARY 1009 (4th ed. 2004). The Zetas certainly meet this minimal definition. See
Cook, supra note 43, at 6-8 (discussing the complex operations of the Zetas).
125.
See Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08,
410 (holding that a person
effectively acting as a military commander encompasses a person exercising control
over, among other things, paramilitary units).
126.
Rome Statute, supranote 9, art. 28(a).
127.
Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08,
415; Prosecutor v. Delalic,
Case No. IT-96-21-A, Appeals Judgment,
256 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Feb. 20, 2001).
128.
Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, 417.
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Los Zetas. 129 The prosecution could bring evidence showing Lazcano's
power to issue orders and ensure compliance based on his
130
authoritarian position.
Furthermore, signs certainly point toward a highly regimented,
military-like command structure giving Lazcano the necessary de
facto control of his subordinate Zetas. 131 Reports have surfaced of a
complex, five-tiered hierarchy within Los Zetas. 132 In addition, the
United States' Drug Enforcement Administration maintains that the
Zetas have a very business-like structure and maintain quarterly
meetings, business ledgers, and vote on major assassinations. 133 The
134
organization also holds extensive training camps for new recruits.
Thus, enough evidence of effective control exists for the Pre-Trial
Chamber to issue a warrant of arrest, where the burden on the
Prosecutor is merely "reasonable grounds to believe" that the
135
commander exercised effective control.
2.

Mens Rea

A commander must have one of two mental states to be held
liable for the crimes of subordinates. 136 First, the commander is liable
if he had direct knowledge that subordinates were committing or
were about to commit such crimes. 13 7 The court cannot presume a
commander's knowledge of the conduct and must take into
consideration the scope, scale, and number of illegal acts, the amount
and type of subordinate forces involved, the timing of the acts and
location of the commander, the means of available communication,

129.
See id.
414 (holding that effective control is "a manifestation of a
superior-subordinate relationship between the suspect and the forces or subordinates
in a de jure or de facto hierarchical relationship (chain of command)"); see also id. 417
(holding that the official position of the accused is a factor in the effective control
analysis).
130.
See id. 417 (listing the "power to issue or give orders," and the power to
ensure compliance with the orders issued" as factors contributing to effective control);
see also id. (holding that proof of the ability to issue orders and ensure that orders are
followed helps demonstrate effective control).
131.
See Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08,
414 (noting that a
superior-subordinate relationship generally demonstrates "effective control").
132.
Hal Brands, Los Zetas and Mexico's TransnationalDrug War, WORLD POL.
REV. (Dec. 25, 2009), http:/Iwww.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/4866/los-zetas-andmexicos-transnational-drug-war.
133.
Ware, supra note 42.
134.
Grayson, supra note 8; Ware, supra note 42.
135.
See Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 58(1)(a); Prosecutor v. Dyilo, Case No.
ICC-01/04-01106, Warrant of Arrest, at 3-4 (Feb. 10, 2006).
136.
See Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 28(a)(i) (explaining that the
commander either knew, or should have known under the circumstances about the
crimes being committed by his or her subordinates).
137.
Id.
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and the nature of the commander's position. 138 Secondly, a
commander is liable if he should have known that subordinates were
committing or were about to commit crimes. 139 This standard asks
whether the commander was negligent in failing to obtain knowledge
140
of the crimes.
If indeed Lazcano had effective control over his subordinate
forces as this Note proposes, it would be very difficult for him to
argue that he should not have known the forces under his control
were committing or were about to commit these acts. There is
evidence that the attacks on migrants groups are a common part of
the Zetas policies and operations. 141 Thus one can infer that Lazcano,
as the Zetas' leader, was aware of these policies and operations. Even
if Lazcano was simply failing to condemn the attacks on migrant
groups, without actually authorizing or endorsing them, the
Prosecutor should have little trouble inferring that Lazcano knew
about the attacks, given his position in the organization's hierarchy.
3.

Failure to Act

Finally, the commander must fail to take steps to prevent or
142
repress the crime or to submit the matter to competent authorities.
This "failure to act" element contains two subelements: (1) failure to
prevent commission and (2) failure to repress commission. 143 Under
failure to prevent, a commander is liable for failing to stop a crime
that is or will be committed by subordinates. 1 44 Failure to repress is
essentially a failure to punish the conduct after the fact. 145 By failing
to condemn such attacks or punish the principal offenders, Lazcano
did nothing to prevent or repress the conduct, and thus failed to act.

431 (referencing standards
138.
See Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08,
supported by the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals).
139.
Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 28(a)(i).
432 ("The 'should have
140.
See Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08,
known' standard requires the superior to 'ha[ve] merely been negligent in failing to
acquire knowledge' of his subordinates' illegal conduct." (alterations in original));
331-32 (Int'l Crim.
Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Trial Judgment,
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 3, 2000) (finding that if a commander "exercise[s]
due diligence in the fulfillment of his duties" and still does not acquire knowledge of
the crime, he will not be held responsible for such crimes).
141.
See supra Part II.A.
142.
Rome Statute, supranote 9, art. 28(a)(ii).
Id.
143.
Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, 437.
144.
254
145.
See Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Appeals Judgment,
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 20, 2001) ("It is the Trial Chamber's
conclusion.., that persons effectively in command of such more informal structures,
with power to prevent or punish the crimes of persons who are in fact under their
control, may under certain circumstances be held responsible for their failure to do so.".
(emphasis added)).
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ADMISSIBILITY: ARTICLE 17'S "UNABLE TO PROSECUTE" PROVISION

Given the probable substantive success of ICC prosecution and
the seriousness of the drug violence, Mexico presents an enticing
possibility for ICC intervention. 1 46 However, despite international
concern for the crimes and potential substantive success, ICC
intervention in Mexico would overlook significant admissibility
concerns that may severely undermine the legitimacy of the ICC's
bedrock complementarity regime. 14 7 Accordingly, this Note now turns
to the admissibility. issues implicated by Mexico's lack of a domestic
codification of Crimes Against Humanity. 148 Admissibility in this case
would likely turn on whether the ICC would determine that Mexico is
"unable to prosecute" Lazcano under Article 17 due to its failure to
implement a Crimes Against Humanity statute, thus rendering
Mexico incapable of charging Lazcano with the equivalent ICC
149
crime.
Article 17(1)(a), in relevant part, explains that a case is not
admissible before the ICC if a state is investigating or prosecuting the
case, unless the state is "unable to genuinely carry out the
investigation or prosecute" the case. 15 In determining a state's
inability to prosecute, one must look to the definition of "unable to
prosecute" found in Article 17(3). Article 17(3) is a two-pronged
inquiry, with the second prong dependent on the occurrence of the
first prong. 15 1 As the provision reads, a state is unable to prosecute
the accused when there is (1) an inability to obtain the accused, (2) an
inability to acquire necessary evidence and testimony, or (3) an
inability to otherwise carry out proceedings. Each of these three
events, however, must stem from either the (A) total or substantial
collapse of the nation's judicial system, or (B) the unavailability of the
national judicial system. 152 It is under the "unavailability of the
national judicial system" prong that Mexico's failure to domestically
implement Crimes Against Humanity could cause the Pre-Trial
Chamber to find Mexico unable to prosecute. But before turning to
the unavailability of the national judiciary, this Note must first

146.
See supra Part II.C (demonstrating Lazcano's individual liability for an
international crime); see also de Cordoba & Luhnow, supra note 6 (describing the
number of lives lost to Mexican drug-related violence, a number that could influence
ICC intervention).
147.
See Newton, supra note 25, at 17 (arguing that holding a case admissible
before the ICC due to a domestic "ordinary crimes" prosecution would undermine the
purpose of complementarity).
148.
Falconi, supra note 23, at 458.
See Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 17(1)(a) (holding in relevant part that
149.
a case is inadmissible before the Court unless the state is unable to prosecute the case).
Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 17(1)(a).
150.
151.
See id. art. 17(3) (defining "inability").
Id.
152.
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address whether Mexico might be unable to prosecute Lazcano under
the "substantial collapse of the national judicial system" prong.
A. Substantial Collapse of the National Judicial System
A substantial collapse of the judicial system requires that,
overall, the state is not capable of ensuring the prosecution of the
individual responsible for the crime. 15 3 The ICC's Informal Paper on
Complementarity lists the lack of necessary personnel, judges,
investigators, or prosecutors, or the general lack of judicial
154
infrastructure as factors that could contribute to a judicial collapse.
Practically speaking, several issues might render Mexico unable to
obtain necessary evidence and testimony, or unable to carry out
proceedings as a result of a substantial collapse. These issues
55
manifest in the significant corruption of Mexican law enforcement
and in the immense resources and tactical abilities of the Zetas. 156 In
Mexico, corruption remains a problem; some would argue a
significant problem. 15 7 This could lead to situations where witnesses
refuse to testify out of fear, or where witnesses are simply bought off
or killed. 158 The Zetas would almost certainly extort witnesses
testifying against Lazcano or potentially attempt to kill them. 15 9
Local government officials could also be at risk, as the Zetas have
shown the ability to affect such officials. 160 One could postulate that

Benzing, supra note 11, at 614.
153.
154.
ICC Office of the Prosecutor, Informal Expert Paper: The Principle of
Complementarity in Practice, ICC-01/04-01/07-1008-AnxA, 31 (Mar. 30, 2009)
[hereinafter ICC Expert Paper].
155.
LAURIE FREEMAN, WASH. OFFICE ON LATIN AM., STATE OF SIEGE: DRUGRELATED VIOLENCE AND CORRUPTION IN MEXICO 1-2 (2006).
156.
Id. at 4-5; see also Cook, supra note 43, at 11 (discussing the Zetas'
significant operational capacity and its infiltrations of law enforcement and the
civilians).
157.
See Corruption Impedes Mexican Drug Fight, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD
(Feb. 28, 2009), http://news.smh.com.aulbreaking-news-world/corruption-impedesmexico-drug-fight-20090228-8krm.html (reporting that the United States believes
corruption remains a key obstacle in overcoming Mexico's drug cartels); Q&A: Mexico's
Drug-Related Violence, supra note 7 (noting that police corruption in Mexico is still
very serious).
See Wilkinson, supra note 49 (describing how residents were terrified to
158.
divulge information about the cartels and only agreed to interview under conditions of
the "strictest anonymity").
159.
See Ken Ellingwood, Mexico Massacre Investigator Missing, Blasts Hit TV
and Police Stations, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 27, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/
(reporting that the investigator
aug/27/world/la-fg-mexico-detectives-20100828
assigned to investigate the Tamaulipas Massacre went missing soon after the massacre
occurred).
160.
See id. (reporting that the investigator for the prosecutor's office with
jurisdiction over the Tamaulipas Massacre went missing a day after the attack); see
also Grayson, supra note 8 (describing how in 2006, the Zetas forced the resignation of
the Nuevo Laredo police chief by dumping three bodies on a road leading into the city).
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161
the Zetas might even pay off or threaten judges and prosecutors.
This could make obtaining necessary evidence and testimony quite
difficult, 16 2 and in the worst case, could result in an unwillingness to
prosecute. 163 There are also legitimate concerns about the ability of
Mexican authorities to obtain the accused, who happens to be the
leader of a heavily armed, tactically advanced paramilitary
164
organization.
Despite these valid concerns and potential roadblocks to a
smooth trial, it is relatively simple to dismiss the notion of a
substantial collapse of Mexico's national judicial system. For one,
President Calder6n has engaged in significant efforts to clean up his
government. 165 He also relies heavily on the Mexican military in his
fight against the cartels-largely because of his mistrust of law
enforcement-thus largely bypassing the problem of local law
enforcement corruption. 166 The Mexican military has shown that it is
very capable of tracking down, engaging, and eliminating even the
1 67
nation's most powerful drug lords.

161.

Ken Ellingwood, Mexico Traffickers Bribed Former Anti-Drug Chief,

Officials Say, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 22, 2008), http://www.latimes.com/la-fg-bribe222008nov22,0,6884272.story (describing the arrest of one of Mexico's top organized
crime prosecutors, on charges on passing information to the Sinaloa cartel); Tracy
Wilkinson, Kidnapped Chihuahua Attorney Found Dead, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2010),
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/nov/06/worldla-fg-mexico-gonzalez-20101106
(describing the kidnapping and murder of Mario Gonzalez, the brother of Chihuahua's
Chief Prosecutor, Patricia Gonzalez).
162.
Article 17(3) holds that inability can be determined when a state is unable
to obtain "the necessary evidence and testimony." Rome Statute, supra note 9, art.
17(3). If the Zetas were successfully buying off or extorting witnesses and government
officials, obtaining necessary evidence and testimony would no doubt be very difficult.
163.
Article 17(2) holds that unwillingness can be determined when a state
instigates proceedings "for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal
responsibility." Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 17(2). If prosecutors and judges were
on the Zetas payroll during the prosecution of Lazcano, then this factor certainly
appears to be in play.
164.
Bureau of Int'l Narcotics & Law Enforcement Affairs, Narcotics Reward
Program: Heriberto Lazcano-Lazcano, U.S. DEP'T STATE, http://www.state.govlj/inl/
narc/rewards/123681.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2012).
165.
Ken Ellingwood, Mexico Fires 3,200 Federal Police Officers, L.A. TIMES
(Aug. 31, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2OlOlaug/31/worldlla-fg-mexico-police-fired20100831; Chris Hawley & Sergio Solache, Mexico Focuses on Police Corruption,USA
TODAY (Feb. 5, 2008), http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/200802-O5-mexicopoliceN.htm.
166.
Calderon's Military Call-Up,
WASH.
POST
(Apr.
2,
2009),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp.dyncontent/graphic/2009/04/01/GR20090401035
31.html; Ken Ellingwood, Army's Role in Mexico Drug War Seen as Crucial yet Risky,
L.A. TIMES (June 3, 2008), http://www.latimes.com/la-fg-mexarmy3-2008jun03,
0,7439731.story.
167.
See Maclean, supra note 3 (describing the successful raid of drug kingpin
Arturo Beltran Leyva); Wilkinson, supra note 45 (reporting the death of a Gulf Cartel
leader during a Mexican military operation).

622

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

/VOL.

45.599

In addition, despite the influence of the Zetas and their
significant tactical capacity, they do not control the entire Mexican
legal system. A nation that loses control of one region but maintains
the judicial system in the rest of the country does not have a
substantially collapsed judiciary under Article 17(3).168 The Zetas
may openly defy the government in some vital regions along their
trafficking routes in Northern Mexico, 169 and may or may not have
judges and prosecutors on their payroll in such regions. But in other
low-trafficking regions, their presence is minimal. 170 Mexico could
easily transfer the case venue to a territory where the Zetas' network
and influence is nominal, 171 and could do so without disclosing the
venue publicly so as to protect the identity of the judges and local
government officials. If necessary, protective measures could be
instituted for all parties: judges, witnesses, prosecutors, and local
172
officials.
Regarding the potential difficulty in capturing Lazcano, a
reasonable mind fails to see how the ICC would solve this problem
with more prudence than the Mexican government. 173 President
Calder6n has employed the Mexican military to fight against the
cartels, and the military has shown the ability to engage the cartels
tactically. 174 The ICC meanwhile, lacks any enforcement arm
whatsoever. 175 Physically obtaining the leader of a paramilitary
narco-trafficking organization requires going out and getting him;

168.
Jakob Pichon, The Principle of Complementarity in the Cases of the
Sudanese Nationals Abmad Harun and Ali Kushayb Before the International Criminal
Court, 8 INT'L CRIM. L. REV. 185, 196 (2008).
169.
Tracy Wilkinson, Mexican Drug Traffickers Blamed in Killing of Second
Mayor, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 30, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/aug/30/world/la-fgmexico-mayor-20100831 (reporting that the suspects held in connection with the
murder of the mayor of Santiago confessed they were working for Los Zetas).
170.
See Chris Hawley, Mexico's Violence Not as Widespread as It Seems, USA
TODAY (Aug. 3, 2010), http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2010-08-03-Mexico-drugviolence_N.htm (reporting that most of Mexico's murders are confined to nine hightrafficking northern states out of Mexico's thirty-one total states, and adding that the
state with the lowest murder rate in Mexico has a rate comparable to that of Montana
and Wyoming).
171.
See id. (noting that most of Mexico's murders take place in nine hightrafficking states out of Mexico's thirty-one total states); Terracino, supra note 18, at
435.
172.
McNeal, supra note 21, at 348-49
173.
See Jurdi, supra note 11, at 87 (discussing the significant problems
associated with basing an "inability to prosecute" determination on the fact that the
state cannot obtain the accused).
174.
E.g., Tracy Wilkinson, La Familia Cartel Leader Believed Killed in
Michoacan Violence, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com2010/dec/
11/world/la-fg-mexico-drug-lord-20101211 (describing a two-day firefight between La
Familia cartel gunmen and Mexican federal troops); Wilkinson, supra note 45
(describing the death of a top Gulf cartel crime boss during a firefight with military
forces).
175.
Jurdi, supra note 11, at 87.

2012]

A COMPLEMENTARITY CONUNDRUM

Lazcano is not going to stroll into a local police station to turn himself
in. 17 6 With an actual enforcement arm and a willingness to use it, the
Mexican government is much better equipped than the ICC to obtain
17 7
Lazcano.
Furthermore, Mexico has significantly increased extraditions to
the United States since President Calder6n took office. 178 In the
highly unlikely event that the situation became so catastrophic that
closed proceedings and individual protective measures were not
enough to ensure a fair trial, Mexico could extradite Lazcano to the
United States for prosecution.' 79 Of course, by extraditing, one can
very plausibly argue that Mexico concedes its unwillingness or
inability to prosecute domestically, thus making the case admissible
before the ICC. i80 However, Mexico is still using a domestic
extradition treaty to facilitate a domestic prosecution. 81 The ICC
Statute's unwillingness and inability definitions do not require the
state precluding ICC admissibility to prosecute the accused on its
own soil.' 8 2 In fact, one could argue that by extraditing, Mexico would
in fact be acting quite consistent with an intent to bring Lazcano to
justice1 8 3 or carry out proceedings against him.' 8 4 But irrespective of
these arguments, if Lazcano was extradited, the United States, as a
nonparty to the ICC, is under no obligation to deliver him to the
Hague, i8 5 and it certainly has an interest in prosecuting him
domestically.18 6 Admissible or not, if Lazcano is extradited to the
l8 7
United States he will not be tried before the ICC.

176.
Mexico Announces Capture of One of the Founders of Los Zetas, CNN (Jan.
18, 2011),
http://articles.cnn.com/2011-01-18/world/
mexico.violencejl.heribertolazcano-cartel-osiel-cardenas-guillen?_s=PM:WORLD (noting that Lazcano remains at
large).
177.
See Jurdi, supra note 11, at 87 (pointing out that the ICC lacks any
enforcement arm).
178.
Ken Ellingwood, Mexico Drug Suspects Extradited at Record Pace, L.A.
TIMES
(Nov.
30, '2008),
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fgextradition30-2008nov30,0,286509.story.
179.
Id.
180.
See Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 17(1)(a) (stating that a case is
admissible before the ICC when a state is unwilling or unable to prosecute the
accused).
181.
See generally Extradition Treaty, U.S.-Mex., May 4, 1978, 31 U.S.T. 5059
(describing the extradition obligations between the United States and Mexico).
182.
See Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 17(2)-(3) (defining "unwillingness" and
"inability").
183.
A state is unwilling to prosecute if the proceedings are not conducted in a
manner consistent with an intent to bring the accused to justice. Id. art. 17(2)(c).
184.
A state is unable to prosecute if it is otherwise unable to carry out
proceedings against the accused. Id. art. 17(3).
185.
States Parties: Western European and Other States, INT'L CRIM. CT.,
http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ASP/States+Parties/Western%20European%20and%20
Other%20States (last visited Mar. 1, 2012).
186.
Penny Starr, DEA Names Eleven 'Most Wanted' Mexican Fugitives Sought
by U.S., CNS NEWS (Apr. 13, 2009), http://cnsnews.com/node/46528 (reporting that
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B. Unavailabilityof the National JudicialSystem
1.

The Debate on Domestic "Ordinary Crimes" Prosecutions

Unavailability of the national judiciary is the more worrisome
trigger that may cause an inability to obtain the accused, to obtain
necessary evidence and testimony, or to otherwise carry out
proceedings.' 88 The ICC Informal Paper lists several factors that can
contribute to an "unavailable" judicial system. These factors include
"obstruction by uncontrolled elements" rendering the system
unavailable, 189 and a "lack of substantive or procedural penal
legislation" rendering the judiciary unavailable. 190 However, beyond
this one informal paper the ICC has provided very little guidance on
the inability to prosecute inquiry.191
Mexico's lack of proper domestic legislation certainly does not
render Mexico unable to obtain the accused or necessary evidence and
testimony, but it may put the nation within the "otherwise unable to
carry out its proceedings" prong of Article 17(3). This prong stems
from Mexico's failure to domestically codify Crimes Against
Humanity. 192 As some scholars note, this "unable to carry out
proceedings" factor might also implicate due process concerns. 19 3 If a
state lacks laws conforming to international standards of due process,
it may render that state unable to prosecute. 194 However, the
language of the statute itself does not comport to this view, as it only
permits the ICC to find that a state is unable to prosecute if national

Lazcano is one of the eleven most wanted Mexican fugitives sought by the United
States).
Id.; see also Dane Schiller & Jacquee Petchel, Under Veil of Secrecy Drug
187.
Kingpin Sentenced, HOUS. CHRON., Feb. 25, 2010, at 11 (describing the twenty-five year
prison sentence handed down in U.S. federal court for Osiel Cardenas Guillen, the
former Gulf Cartel boss who helped spawn the Zetas in the late 1990s).
188.
Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 17(3).
189.
ICC Expert Paper, supra note 154, at 31. An "obstruction by uncontrolled
elements" could, under certain circumstances, render the system unavailable due to an
inability to obtain the accused or evidence and testimony. See Ellingwood, supra note
159 (reporting that the investigator investigating the Tamaulipas Massacre went
missing a day after the attack). This factor could arguably capture the corruption in
Mexico and the Zetas' potential to resort to extortive methods, as referenced above. See
McNeal, supra note 32, at 343 (contending that the security situation in Iraq during
the Sadaam Hussein trial could have implicated the "obstruction by uncontrolled
elements" factor of the inability analysis).
190.
ICC Expert Paper,supra note 154, at 31.
191.
McNeal, supra note 21, at 329.
192.
Terracino, supra note 18, at 428. Of course, Mexico could solve this problem
by simply implementing Crimes Against Humanity domestically, but to date this has
not occurred. Falconi, supra note 23.
193.
McNeal, supra note 21, at 330; Carsten Stahn, Complementarity,
Amnesties, and Alternative Forms of Justice: Some Interpretive Guidelines for the
InternationalCriminal Court, 3 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 695, 713 (2005).
McNeal, supranote 21, at 330.
194.
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proceedings make it more difficult to convict the accused. 19 5
Furthermore, in 2008, Mexico amended its Constitution to include a
presumption of innocence and the allowance for oral trials, putting to
19 6
rest-at least facially-its most glaring procedural deficiencies.
While the ICC may very well become sympathetic to the "due process"
approach to inability, 9 7 the question of whether Mexico's judicial
system conforms to international standards of due process is beyond
the scope of this Note's inquiry. This Note is concerned with Mexico's
inability to prosecute based on its failure to codify the relevant ICC
crime domestically. Given that the inability standard regarding
ordinary crimes has significant ramifications for the ICC's ability to
exercise jurisdiction despite state activity, an unexplored definition of
inability in this respect leaves the foundations of Article 17's
19
complementarity principle unstable. 8
Some scholars argue that if the ICC were to consider a state
unable to prosecute based on a lack of domestic implementation of an
ICC crime, the ICC would undermine the legitimacy of its
complementarity regime and its respect for national prosecutions. In
essence, the ICC would create an express obligation on states to both
codify and charge the "proper" substantive crime, simply to preclude
199
ICC jurisdiction and maintain its sovereign right to prosecute.
Indeed, the ICC Statute's Preamble recognizes that the ICC is
complementary, not primary, to domestic prosecutions. 20 0 In addition,
Article 18 requires that, when the Prosecutor initiates an
investigation, it must notify the states parties who could legally
exercise jurisdiction over the conduct. 20 1 This gives such states the
opportunity to exercise their domestic jurisdiction by initiating an
investigation or by demonstrating an ongoing investigation or
prosecution. 202 Accordingly, requiring an ICC state party charge the
"proper" ICC crime just to retain jurisdiction intrudes upon a state's
sovereign right to prosecute crimes occurring on its territory as it so
203
chooses.
Furthermore, Article 17(1)(c) explicitly recognizes that a case is
inadmissible when the ICC is prohibited under Article 20(3) from

195.
Heller, supra note 32.
196.
David Luhnow, Presumption of Guilt, WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 2009, at W1.
197.
See McNeal, supra note 21, at 332 (explaining that the ICC may be
migrating toward an inability inquiry based on whether the state has adequate fair
trial guarantees in its national laws).
198.
Id. at 330 ("Absent a clear definition of 'unable,' states do not know the
current scope of the ICC's jurisdiction or how far it may expand.").
199.
Newton, supranote 25, at 17; Pichon, supranote 168, at 197.
200.
Rome Statute, supra note 9, pmbl. para. 10.
201.
Id. art. 18(1).
202.
Id. art. 18(2) (holding that a state has one month from notification to
"inform the Court that it is investigating or has investigated").
203.
Newton, supra note 25, at 17.
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exercising jurisdiction. 20 4 Article 20(3), the ICC's provision against
double jeopardy, precludes the ICC from exercising jurisdiction over
the conduct of a perpetrator when that perpetrator was tried by
another court for conduct also within the ICC's jurisdiction. 20 5 This is
in contrast to the language of the ICTY and International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) double jeopardy provisions, which
permit the ICTY and ICTR to try a person previously tried
domestically if that person was simply charged with an "ordinary
crime," such as domestic murder or rape. 20 6 Thus, ICTY and ICTR
double jeopardy hinges on whether the substantive crime was subject
to prior prosecution, whereas ICC double jeopardy is based on
20 7
whether the conduct was subject to prior prosecution.
The end result of Article 20(3) is that under Article 17(1)(c), the
ICC cannot try conduct previously prosecuted domestically. This
could influence the ICC, under Article 17(1)(a), to hold inadmissible a
case currently being prosecuted domestically, given the right
conditions. 20 8 Article 20(3) once again proves useful in determining
these conditions. 20 9 Article 20(3) provides exceptions to the rule
against double jeopardy when the prior domestic proceedings were
undertaken to shield the accused from responsibility or were
210
inconsistent with an intent to bring the accused to justice.
Provided the ordinary crime adequately captures the severity of the
conduct and adequately holds the perpetrator accountable for his or
her actions, it is difficult to claim that domestic proceedings shield
the accused from justice or are inconsistent with an intent to bring
the perpetrator to justice. 2 1 1 Under this theory, if Mexico's
prosecution for an ordinary crime captures the severity of the

204.
Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 17(1)(c).
205.
Id. art 20(3).
206.
See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda art. 9(2)(a),
Nov. 8, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1598 [hereinafter ICTR Statute] ("A person who has been tried
by a national court for acts constituting serious violations of international
humanitarian law may be subsequently tried by the International Tribunal only if: (a)
the act for which he or she was tried was characterized as an ordinary crime .... ");
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia art. 10(2)(a),
May 25, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1192 [hereinafter ICTY Statute] (same); see also Benzing,
supra note 11, at 616 (arguing that the ICC's ne bis in idem provision encompasses
broader latitude to domestic prosecutions than the ad hoc tribunals).
207.
Compare ICTY Statute, supra note 206, art. 10(2)(a), and ICTR Statute,
supra note 206, art. 9(2)(A) (explaining that a person may be tried by the tribunal
when the act for which he or she was tried domestically was an "ordinary crime"), with
Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 20(3) (explaining that a person cannot be tried by the
ICC when the conduct forming the basis of ICC jurisdiction was previously tried by
another court).
208.
Benzing, supra note 11, at 616.
209.
See Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 20(3)(a)-(b) (providing exceptions to
inadmissibility under specific conditions of improper domestic proceedings).
210.
Id.
211.
Benzing, supra note 11, at 616.
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Tamaulipas Massacre and provides an adequate sentence for the
attack, the ICC should not exercise jurisdiction over the case because
212
Mexico is not "unable to prosecute.
Other scholars, however, view the ICC's stated mission of ending
impunity for international atrocity crimes as likely implicating ICC
jurisdiction in the case of a failure to implement ICC crimes
domestically.2 1x Under such a view, if Mexico does not charge
Lazcano with an ICC crime, then the ICC could hold the case
admissible because Mexico is "unable to prosecute" under Article
17(1)(a). This view is supported by the overwhelming practice of the
states parties to domestically implement ICC crimes. 214 Additionally,
these scholars point to the statute's Preamble as imposing an
obligation on states parties to implement the ICC's substantive
crimes. 2 15 Paragraph six of the Preamble to the Rome Statute recalls
"the duty of every state to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those
responsible for internationalcrimes."2 16 Paragraphs four and five of
the Preamble affirm the desire to punish the most serious
international crimes and end impunity for such crimes. 217 Simply
prosecuting conduct as an ordinary domestic crime, when in fact the
conduct satisfies the elements of an international crime, may be
contrary to the duty of states parties and may undermine the ICC's
218
stated purpose of punishing international atrocity crimes as such.
Indeed, the Preamble recognizes that atrocity crimes "threaten the
peace, security, and well-being of the world. '219 Thus, prosecuting
conduct that qualifies as a Crime Against Humanity simply as an
ordinary crime promotes impunity for Crimes Against Humanity
because the crime is not being recognized and punished as the
international atrocity it is. 220 Given the worldwide interest implicated
by atrocities, domestic prosecutions for ordinary crimes warrant
international jurisdiction when the conduct meets the elements of an

212.
Id.
213.
Kleffner, supra note 22, at 90-94.
214.
Id. at 92.
215.
Id. at 92-93.
216.
Rome Statute, supra note 9, pmbl. para. 6 (emphasis added).
217.
Id. pmbl. paras. 4-5.
218.
Kleffner, supra note 22, at 93.
219.
Rome Statute, supranote 9, pmbl. para. 3.
220.
See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Decision on the Defence
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction,
58-59 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995) ("Indeed, when an international tribunal such as the
present one is created, it must be endowed with primacy over national courts.
Otherwise,... there would be a perennial danger of international crimes being
characterised as 'ordinary crimes."').
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international crime and implicates worldwide humanitarian interests
22 1
and concerns.
2.

The Admissibility of Lazcano's Case

Assuming Mexico would in fact attempt to prosecute Lazcano for
the Tamaulipas Massacre, the issue would be whether Mexico, due to
its lack of a domestic codification of Crimes Against Humanity, is
otherwise unable to carry out its proceedings, thus rendering its
judicial system unavailable under Article 17(3).222 Mexico would have
to charge Lazcano with the ordinary crime of domestic murder, as it
is quite literally unable to charge Lazcano with an international
crime for the conduct in question.2 23 But simply because the relevant
international charge is not available to Mexico does not mean that
Mexico's judicial system is unavailable to the point that Mexico is
unable to carry out proceedings against Lazcano. 224 Despite its
inability to charge an ICC crime, Mexico can still charge Lazcano
2 25
with multiple counts of a very serious crime: murder.
Consequently, in prosecuting for an ordinary crime, the Mexican
judicial system could carry out proceedings, and thus the judicial
system is quite available.226 Assuming a conviction, the sentence for
up to seventy-two counts of murder stemming from the Tamaulipas
Massacre would certainly incarcerate Lazcano for the remainder of
his natural life. 227 Thus, the threat of impunity that drives the engine
of ICC admissibility does not exist in this particular case, nor would it

221.
Id.; see also Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 5 ("The jurisdiction of the
Court shall be limited to the most serious crimes of concern to the international
community as a whole.").
222.
Terracino, supra note 18, at 435-37 (discussing whether a domestic
ordinary crimes prosecution allows the ICC to find the state unable to prosecute under
the definition of inability in Article 17(3)).
223.
See Falconi, supra note 23 (recognizing that while the Rome Statute has
been ratified, the criminal offenses have yet to be included in Mexican criminal
legislation).
224.
Terracino, supra note 18, at 436.
225.
Press Release, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, ICE Deports
Illegal Alien to Face Murder Charges in Mexico (May 13, 2010), available at
http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/1005/100513washington.htm.
226.
See Kleffner, supra note 22, at 96 (arguing that a state clearly carries out
its proceedings when it prosecutes for ordinary crimes); Terracino, supra note 18, at
436 (same)
227.
Mexico Alters Extradition Rules, BBC NEWS (Nov. 30, 2005),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2[hi/4483746.stm (reporting on a Mexican Supreme Court
decision striking down a constitutional provision banning life without parole, which
also overturned Mexico's ban on extraditing nationals facing a life sentence in that
receiving country).
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exist in most instances of drug-related killings. 228 Murder, as a crime
entailing the most severe domestic sentence, 2 29 sufficiently captures
the atrociousness of the conduct, and would do so in nearly every
circumstance. 230 In short, Lazcano would not get a break with
domestic charges, 231 and his conduct would not go unpunished or
inadequately punished. 232 While he cannot be convicted of an
international crime if tried domestically, 233 his sentence would be as
2 34
harsh as possible under accepted international standards.
Article 20(3) strongly supports the argument that Mexico is able
to prosecute under Article 17(1)(c). 235 As mentioned previously,
Article 20(3) explains that the ICC cannot exercise jurisdiction over
conduct within the ICC's substantive jurisdiction if the person was
previously tried for that same conduct by another court (i.e., a
domestic court). 2 36 The ICC Statute thus bars ICC jurisdiction in a
situation where a previously charged domestic crime differs from the
ICC's charged crime. 23 7 When examining Article 20(3) in light of the
ICTY and ICTR provisions against double jeopardy, this argument
238
becomes even stronger. The ICTY and ICTR ne bis in idem
provisions specifically reference domestic prosecutions for ordinary
crimes and permit the respective tribunals to exercise jurisdiction in

228.
Kleffner, supra note 22, at 97 (arguing that a conviction and sentence on
domestic murder charges is likely to adequately reflect the gravity of the perpetrator's
conduct).
229.
C6digo Penal Federal [CPF] [Federal Criminal Code], as amended, art. 320,
Diario Official de la Federaci6n [DO], 14 de Agosto de 1931 (Mex.) (stating that murder
is punishable by a sentence of between thirty and sixty years).
230.
Kleffner, supra note 22, at 97.
231.
C6digo Penal Federal [CPF] [Federal Criminal Code], as amended, art. 320,
Diario Official de la Federaci6n [DO], 14 de Agosto de 1931 (Mex.).
232.
See Julia Preston, Raul Salinas's Sentence in Mexico Murder Is Cut to 27 /
Years, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 1999, at A2. The article describes the sentence of Mr.
Salinas for one count of murder back when Mexico had a maximum sentence of fifty
years without parole. Id. Lazcano faces potentially seventy-two counts of murder
stemming from the Tamaulipas Massacre, as opposed to one count. See Ellingwood,
supra note 10 (reporting that seventy-two people were executed by the Zetas in late
August of 2010).
233.
Falconi, supra note 23.
234.
The death penalty is generally not an acceptable sentence in international
law. See AMNESTY INT'L, INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS ON THE DEATH PENALTY 3-7

(2006), available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/ACT50/001/2006 (giving an
excellent overview of international authority condemning the death penalty). The
Rome Statute imposed a maximum sentence of thirty years, with an exception of life
imprisonment "when justified by the extreme gravity of the crime and the individual
circumstances of the convicted person." Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 77(1).
235.
Benzing, supra note 11, at 616.
236.
Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 20(3).
237.
Id.
238.
Ne Bis in Idem is Latin for "Not Twice for the Same." It is a fancy way of
saying "no double jeopardy." Anthony J. Colangelo, Double Jeopardy and Multiple
Sovereigns:A JurisdictionalTheory, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 778-79 (2009).
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spite of a domestic "ordinary crimes" prosecution. 239 Thus, the ad hoc
tribunals based the concept of double jeopardy on whether an
international crime was previously charged by another court. 240 In
contrast, Article 20(3) of the ICC Statute precludes ICC admissibility
when the conduct was previously subject to prosecution by another
court. 24 1 Thus, ICC double jeopardy has nothing to do with whether
the "proper crime" was previously charged, but instead has to do with
whether the specific conduct was previously charged. 242 By departing
from the language of the ad hoc tribunals, Article 20(3) shows that
the drafters of the ICC Statute sought to preclude ICC admissibility
over conduct substantively within ICC jurisdiction that was already
243
prosecuted domestically as an ordinary crime.
Article 20(3) governs situations of prior domestic prosecution,
while Article 17(1)(a) determines admissibility for cases currently
under domestic investigation or prosecution. The provisions are very
clearly related, which allows the language of Article 20(3) to inform
the interpretation of inability under Article 17(1)(a). 244 As explained
above, Article 20(3) prohibits ICC admissibility when conduct was
already prosecuted by another court, subject to the provision's
exceptions.2 45 Similarly, conduct currently under investigation or
prosecution by another court makes the case inadmissible under
Article 17(l)(a), subject to the provision's exceptions. 246 The
exceptions to the general rule of inadmissibility in Article 20(3)
provide that when the prior proceedings were designed to shield the
accused from justice, or were conducted in a manner inconsistent
with an intent to bring the person to justice, the ICC may hold the
case admissible despite the prior prosecution. 247 The exceptions to
inadmissibility in Article 17(1)(a) are, of course, a state's
2 48
unwillingness or inability to prosecute.

239.
ICTR Statute, supra note 206, art. 9(2)(a); ICTY Statute, supra note 206,
art. 10(2)(a).
240.
See ICTR Statute, supra note 206, art. 9(2)(a) (limiting proceedings in the
tribunal to persons not previously tried in national courts, unless that proceeding
comprised only "ordinary crimes"); ICTY Statute, supra note 206, art. 10(2)(a) (same);
see also Pichon, supra note 168, at 197 (explaining the difference between the Rome
Statute Article 20 and the ad hoc tribunals' double jeopardy provisions).
241.
Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 20(3); Benzing, supra note 11, at 616.
242.
Kleffner, supra note 22, at 96.
243.
Id.
244.
Benzing, supra note 11, at 616-17; Pichon, supra note 168, at 197.
245.
Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 20(3).
246.
See Benzing, supra note 11, at 617 (noting that crimes currently under
investigation or under prosecution fall within the scope of Article 17); Pichon, supra
note 168, at 197 (noting that the Rome Statute does not allow the ICC to prosecute a
person that has already been convicted by a national court for an "ordinary crime").
247.
Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 20(3).
248.
Id. art. 17(1)(a).
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The exceptions to Article 20(3) are clearly not implicated by
domestic murder charges.2 49 Prosecution for domestic murder would
not be an attempt to shield Lazcano from justice, nor would such
2 50
charges be inconsistent with an intent to bring him to justice.
Murder charges would reflect a clear intent to hold Lazcano
accountable for the Tamaulipas Massacre, as the nature and
251
punishment for these charges would reflect the act's severity.
Thus, the case would clearly be inadmissible before the ICC if the
domestic ordinary crimes prosecution was already complete when the
ICC stepped in. 252 However, if the ICC were to hold that domestic
murder charges brought concurrent to ICC action create an inability
to prosecute, then an exception to inadmissibility under Article
17(1)(a) would be implicated. 253 Suddenly, the exact same case would
be admissible simply because the domestic prosecution is not final
before the Pre-Trial Chamber issues an arrest warrant.2 54 In effect,
such a decision would reduce the admissibility determination of a
given case, in terms of domestic prosecutions, to a question of timing
by the ICC Prosecutor. This is cold comfort for states parties.
IV.THE

IMPLICATIONS OF ORDINARY CRIMES PROSECUTIONS

To oversimplify the issue, Mexico initiated its crackdown on the
drug cartels, 255 and should reap the political rewards of that
crackdown when the opportunity to prosecute cartel leadership
manifests itself. Of course, as this Note demonstrates, this reward is
subject to Mexico's potential inability to prosecute the case. 256 While
Mexico lacks a domestic codification of the Crimes Against
Humanity, 25 7 this alone is not dispositive of Mexico's inability to
prosecute Heriberto Lazcano. The conduct underlying the particular
crime in question involved multiple premeditated murders.25 8 Mexico
can prosecute domestically for an ordinary crime that carries with it a

249.
Id. art. 20(3).
250.
Id.
251.
C6digo Penal Federal [CPF] [Federal Criminal Code], as amended, art. 320,
Diario Official de la Federaci6n [DO], 14 de Agosto de 1931 (Mex.).
252.
Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 20(3).
253.
Id. art. 17(1)(a) (stating that an inability to prosecute is grounds for
admissibility).
254.
See Benzing, supra note 11, at 617 (pointing out the possible contradiction
of holding a case inadmissible under Article 20(3) and holding a case admissible under
Article 17(3)).
loan Grillo, Mexico's New President to Take on Drug Gangs, DAILY BREEZE
255.
(Torrance, Cal.), Dec. 12, 2006, at A12.
256.
See supra Part III (discussing the inability to prosecute inquiry under
Article 17(1)(a) and Article 17(3)).
Falconi, supra note 23, at 458.
257.
Ellingwood, supra note 10.
258.
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nature and sentence comporting with international sentencing
guidelines. 259 The sentence reflects the seriousness, and thus the
atrociousness of the crime. 260 The threat of impunity or concerns of a
disproportionately lenient response failing to reflect the atrocious
nature of the act are, at best, symbolic fears. Resting arguments of
impunity and disproportional leniency on merely the title of the
charged crime is a symbolic concern that in no way justifies the
intrusion into state sovereignty that would necessarily follow.
This is not to make light of the international community's
interests in ending impunity and recognizing atrocity crimes in such
a manner that reflects their egregious nature. After all, the ICC
Statute recognizes that atrocity crimes implicate the interests of the
international community as a whole. 261 It follows that these crimes
should be recognized as such, but only in appropriate circumstances.
Admittedly, it may be difficult to find a comparatively sufficient
ordinary crime that reflects the seriousness and atrociousness of the
international War Crime of "[d]estroying or seizing the property of an
adversary. '262 Assuming the domestic state lacks domestic
implementation of the relevant War Crimes provision, 263 the domestic
prosecutor might have to settle for simply charging domestic theft.
While the admissibility or inadmissibility of this hypothetical
scenario is beyond the scope of this Note, there is clearly a stronger
argument favoring the state's inability to prosecute this hypothetical
destruction of property than in the case of Heriberto Lazcano, where
the domestic prosecutor could charge multiple counts of premeditated
264
murder that would carry an appropriately harsh sentence.
However, the ICC could attempt to justify Mexico's inability to
prosecute based on Mexico's precarious security situation. 265 While
this Note posits that the security concerns in Mexico are not
significant enough to give rise to inability, if the concerns became
significant in Lazcano's case, Mexico could extradite him to the
United States. 266 In doing so, Mexico would still be using domestic

259.
Compare Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 77(1) (providing for a sentence of
thirty years, except in cases of extreme gravity, in which a life sentence is authorized),
with C6digo Penal Federal [CPF] [Federal Criminal Code], as amended, art. 320, Diario
Official de la Federaci6n [DO], 14 de Agosto de 1931 (Mex.) (providing a sentence of
thirty to sixty years for the crime of murder).
260.
Kleffner, supra note 22, at 97.
261.
Rome Statute, supra note 9, pmbl. para. 3 ("Recognizing that such grave
crimes threaten the peace, security and well-being of the world ... .
262.
Id. art. 8(2)(e)(12).
263.
Article 8 of the Rome Statute covers War Crimes. Id. art. 8.
264.
See Kleffner, supra note 22, at 97 (arguing that some ICC crimes may not
have an appropriate ordinary crime affiliate).
265.
See supra Part III (discussing how Mexico's security situation relates to
inadmissibility).
266.
Ellingwood, supra note 178.
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26 7
means-an extradition treaty-to facilitate a domestic prosecution.
This could prevent a finding of ICC admissibility under Article 17,
irrespective of the fact that the United States has no obligation to
26
turn over its prisoners to the ICC. 8
Due to the comparative penal strength of the ordinary crime and
Mexico's ability to work around its security concerns, Lazcano's case
is not one of the "appropriate circumstances" justifying strict
26 9
The ICC
reflection of an international crime as the atrocity it is.
to
ordinary
approach
case-by-case
should adopt a circumstantial,
of the
nature
the
whether
with
crimes prosecutions that is concerned
the
reflects
adequately
sentence
ordinary crime and its corresponding
similar
a
comparatively
and
imposes
atrocious nature of the conduct
or harsher punishment in relation to international sentencing
270
standards.
But why should the ICC care about ordinary crimes? The ICC
determines the admissibility of a given case, not the state bringing
the admissibility challenge. 27 1 Why should the ICC determine that a
case is admissible despite a concurrent ordinary crimes prosecution in
only "appropriate circumstances," as suggested above? First, if the
ICC adopts a rule that active ordinary crimes prosecutions are per se
evidence of a state's inability to prosecute, it not only contradicts the
express language of Article 20(3),272 but also creates an obligation on
states parties to precisely implement all ICC crimes in order to avoid
273
potential ICC usurpation of an ongoing domestic prosecution.
Staunch ICC proponents argue that the preambular language of the
ICC Statute clearly reflects the obligation of the states to prosecute
27 4
international crimes, and thus such an obligation is unproblematic.
The states parties ratified the Rome Statute voluntarily, and in doing
so willingly gave away a portion of their sovereignty in the interests
of international accountability for atrocity crimes. As a result, the
states parties should be required to implement substantive domestic
legislation to preserve their own sovereign right to prosecute.

See generally Extradition Treaty, supra note 181 (describing the extradition
267.
obligations between the United States and Mexico).
268.
States Parties: Western European and Other States, supra note 185
(showing absence of United States as a party to the Rome Statute).
See Kleffner, supra note 22, at 97 (describing the importance of considering
269.
relative penalties for the crime in the domestic and the international court).
See Pichon, supra note 168, at 197 (arguing that the ICC could require
270.
states impose adequate sentencing in ordinary crimes prosecutions).
See Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 19(1) ("The Court shall satisfy itself
271.
that it has jurisdiction in any case brought before it.").
272.
Article 20(3) states that conduct previously tried by another court is not
admissible before the ICC. Id. art. 20(3).
Terracino, supra note 18, at 438-39.
273.
Rome Statute, supra note 9, pmbl. paras. 4, 6.
274.
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But this argument overlooks the most critical point. While the
states parties did voluntarily ratify the ICC Statute, the Statute
contains no express obligation to domestically implement ICC
crimes. 275 The Preamble recognizes a national duty to prosecute
international crimes, but does not impose a duty to prosecute such
crimes in accordance with substantive ICC law. 2 76 The states parties
voluntarily
signed
a
document
that
lacks,
presumably
intentionally,2 7 7 any domestic implementing obligation. Indeed, the
plain text of the statute at Article 20(3) recognizes prior ordinary
crimes prosecutions as legitimate domestic prosecutions that preclude
admissibility. 278 By failing to recognize concurrent ordinary crimes
investigations or prosecutions as legitimate domestic proceedings, the
ICC would create an obligation to implement, thus infringing on the
sovereignty of states parties, when in fact the states parties signed a
document containing no such obligation in its text. The states parties
are certainly wise to implement ICC crimes to curb potential ICC
intrusions into state sovereignty, but the states parties are not, and
should not be required to implement substantive domestic legislation
279
to preserve their sovereign rights.
Some scholars argue that the ICC should be read to implicitly
contain a domestic implementing obligation. 28 0 This promotes
facilitation of effective domestic prosecutions for international crimes
that appropriately reflect the international humanitarian interests at
stake in such atrocities. 28 1 However, the question of whether the ICC
Statute should contain, or should be read to contain, an implementing
obligation is an entirely different question from whether an obligation
actually exists in the text. The fact that there is debate about
28 2
whether the ICC Statute contains any implementing obligation
necessarily implies that there is indeed no express obligation;
otherwise there would be no need for debate. This lack of an express
implementing obligation should preclude the ICC from imposing one
on the states parties.

275.
Kleffner, supranote 22, at 91.
276.
Rome Statute, supra note 9, pmbl.
277.
Terracino, supra note 18, at 438 (discussing the intentional removal of an
ordinary crimes exception to inadmissibility during the 1998 meetings of the
Preparatory Committee).
278.
Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 20(3).
279.
See Newton, supra note 25, at 17 (arguing that complementarity is
"severely weakened" if the ICC Prosecutor can essentially dictate acceptable domestic
charges).
280.
Kleffner, supra note 22, at 92-93.
281.
See Terracino, supra note 18, at 439 ("Regular national prosecutions for
ordinary crimes are not desirable and would undermine the fundamental idea on which
the international criminal justice system is founded.").
282.
Kleffner, supranote 22, at 90-91.
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Secondly, if the ICC were to create an implied implementing
obligation, it would risk alienating the cooperation of the states
parties, on whom it is wholly dependent for investigative purposes.
The situation in Mexico provides an ideal illustration. Mexico is a
willing state that has invested a tremendous amount of resources into
combating its drug-trafficking problem domestically. 283 Robbing
Mexico of the opportunity to prosecute the spoils of its costly efforts
would not endear the ICC to Mexico or the rest of its member states.
More importantly, all crimes within ICC jurisdiction still occur in the
sovereign territory of a state. Thus, the ICC is largely, if not fully,
dependent on the cooperation of states parties to apprehend
perpetrators, obtain witnesses, and otherwise conduct effective
investigations. 28 4 While the states parties have an express obligation
to cooperate with the ICC, 28 5 this does not mean that a state is
unable to make life particularly difficult for the ICC and its
investigators. Additionally, a state party may always withdraw from
the Rome Statute if it feels that the impediment on its sovereign
interests is too great. If the ICC finds a way, through ordinary crimes,
to exercise jurisdiction in spite of state prosecutorial action, it might
convince some member states that the treaty is no longer in its best
interests.
Finally, by holding cases admissible despite an ordinary crimes
prosecution, the ICC would add fuel to the fire for skeptical states
that refuse to ratify the Statute, namely the United States. Article 17
exists to ensure that ICC prosecutions are complementary to domestic
prosecutions, in that they exist only to fill in gaps where domestic
prosecutions fall short and permit pockets of impunity.28 6 Thus, at its
core, complementarity is a restrictive principle, designed to limit ICC
authority.28 7 This principle was fashioned in Article 17 out of respect
for national institutions and deference to the sovereign right of states
to prosecute offenders for crimes committed within their nationality
or territorial jurisdictions. 28 8 The states parties ratified the ICC

283.
Merle D. Kellerhals, Jr., Merida Initiative Will Help Battle Drug
(July
1,
2008),
http://newsblaze.com/story/
Trafficking,
NEWS
BLAZE
20080701063119tsop.nb/topstory.html (reporting that as of July 2008, the Mexican
government had spent an estimated $7 billion in an eighteen-month period fighting
drug trafficking organizations).
284.
Giulio M. Gallarotti & Arik Y. Preis, Politics,InternationalJustice, and the
United States: Toward a Permanent International Criminal Court, 4 UCLA J. INT'L L.
& FOREIGN AFF. 1, 28 (1999).

See Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 86 ("States Parties shall, in accordance
285.
with the provisions of this Statute, cooperate fully with the Court in its investigation
and prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.").
Newton, supra note 22, at 47-48.
286.
Newton, supra note 25, at 11.
287.
288.
Benzing, supra note 11, at 595.
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Statute largely because they believe Article 17 sufficiently protects
28 9
state sovereignty.
Meanwhile, the United States remains opposed to the ICC in
part because it believes that Article 17 provides inadequate
protection for domestic prosecutions. 290 If the Pre-Trial Chamber
were to hold a case admissible under Article 17 despite a concurrent
domestic prosecution, the fears of the United States would largely be
confirmed. By failing to respect concurrent ordinary crimes
prosecutions, the ICC would essentially create a loophole in Article
17's complementarity regime through which the ICC could exercise
jurisdiction despite simultaneous state action. This would undermine
the very purpose for which complementarity was created. Article 17
would become a hollow protection for national prosecutions, and by
extension, hollow protection for national sovereignty. If the
international community were to ultimately see the ICC as intruders
upon grounds reserved for its member states, the ICC would severely
undermine its institutional legitimacy and purpose.
V. CONCLUSION

The ICC would be wise to adopt a circumstantial, case-by-case
inquiry regarding the admissibility of a case in which there is also a
concurrent ordinary crimes prosecution. The inquiry should center on
whether the nature of the ordinary crime and its associated penalty
adequately reflect the international scope and atrociousness of the
conduct. 291 Of course, the ICC may adopt other factors it deems
relevant, but this Note argues that the critical factor is the nature
and sentence associated with the domestic crime. A comparatively
severe domestic charge and sentence satisfies the international
community's concerns regarding impunity or potential leniency for
atrocity perpetrators who are subject to domestic proceedings. 292 In
contrast, a comparatively weak domestic charge and sentence for the
domestic crime would likely not capture the gravity of the
perpetrator's conduct. 293 In the case of homicides or sexual offenses, a
correspondingly weak domestic charge and sentence is extremely
unlikely.
Mexico presents a situation in which the proposed circumstantial
ordinary crimes inquiry should lead to inadmissibility. Using the

289.
See Rolf Einar Fife, The International Criminal Court: Whence It Came,
Where It Goes, 69 NORDIC J. INT'L L. 63, 68 (2000) (noting that the lack of concurrent
jurisdiction with national courts is important for the perceived legitimacy of the court).
290.
Carla Levy Rodriguez, Slaying the Monster: Why the United States Should
Not Support the Rome Treaty, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 805, 816-18 (1999).
291.
Pichon, supra note 168, at 197.
292.
Benzing, supra note 11, at 617.
293.
Kleffner, supra note 22, at 97.
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hypothetical prosecution of notorious Los Zetas leader Heriberto "The
Executioner" Lazcano, this Note demonstrates that substantively
speaking, the Pre-Trial Chamber could arrest Lazcano as an
individual for a crime within the ICC's jurisdiction. However, due to
the comparatively strong ordinary crime that Mexico would charge in
this situation, Mexico is not unable to prosecute Lazcano under
Article 17(1)(a) and Article 17(3) of the Rome Statute, 294 despite its
295
failure to domestically implement Crimes Against Humanity.
There are admittedly concerns about the security situation in Mexico,
especially given the sophisticated paramilitary capabilities of
Lazcano's organization. 296 However, these concerns are addressable
domestically, and in a worst-case scenario Mexico could still facilitate
a domestic prosecution by extraditing Lazcano to the United
29 7
States.
The facts of Lazcano's prosecution are applicable to other
potential ICC cases in Mexico. The ICC is unlikely to intervene in
Mexico for crimes not involving murder, kidnapping, or human
trafficking, as the ICC is constrained to crimes that are of "the most8
29
serious concern to the international community as a whole."
Simple crimes carried out by the cartels, such as various thefts or
assault, are very unlikely to rise to this high level of international
concern outside the context of an armed conflict, 299 and the crime of
drug trafficking is not within the ICC's jurisdiction. 30 0 The sentences
associated with murder, kidnapping, and human trafficking are likely
30 1
harsh enough to reflect the atrocious nature of the conduct.
Regarding security concerns for other cases, Mexico is capable of
addressing the situation and implementing appropriate protective
measures on a case-by-case basis, and extradition to the United
States is always an option for perpetrators associated with trafficking
narcotics into the United States. 30 2 Thus, under the concurrent

294.
See supra note 19.
295.
Falconi, supra note 23, at 458.
296.
Ware, supra note 42.
297.
Cf. Ellingwood, supra note 178 (noting the sharp increase in extraditions
from Mexico to the United States under the Calder6n Administration).
298.
Rome Statute, supra note 9, pmbl. para. 4.
299.
See supra Part II (discussing the nonexistence of an armed conflict in
Mexico).
300.
See Rome Statute, supra note 9, arts. 5-8 (lacking any definition of drug
trafficking or any form of narcotics activity as an offense within the jurisdiction of the
Court).
301.
See C6digo Penal Federal [CPF] [Federal Criminal Code], as amended, art.
320, Diario Official de la Federaci6n [DO], 14 de Agosto de 1931 (Mex.) (providing a
sentence of thirty to sixty years for the crime of murder); Elisabeth Malkin, Mexico:
Kidnap Sentence Upheld,-France Warns of Consequences, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2011, at
A8 (describing a French national sentenced to sixty years imprisonment in Mexico on
kidnapping charges).
302.
Extradition Treaty, supra note 181, at 190, 196.
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ordinary crimes test proposed in this Note, these crimes would not be
admissible before the ICC. Given this conclusion, Mexico is not a
situation in which the ICC would be wise to intervene. If the ICC
were to get involved in Mexico, it would simply undercut its own
highly valued complementarity regime, and, as a result, significantly
damage itself as a legitimate supranational judicial institution.
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